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The authors present an introduction to command and
control (c2) and establish a foundation for understanding
the complex nature of C^ and the C^ process. A historical
perspective is presented which demonstrates the importance
of effective C^ to national, military, and political
objectives. The command and control process is described,
and the basic characteristics of a C^ system are specified.
The command and control structure of the United States
military organization is presented. An introduction to the
architecture of C^ systems is described, and a conceptual
architecture of the C^ process is developed. The authors
describe the U.S. strategic nuclear command and control
structure and provide a basic description of the tactical
warfighting doctrines and C^ structures of the U.S. Armed
Forces including the wartime operations of the Coast Guard.
The authors conclude with a fundamental approach to the
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The physical manifestation of command and control (C^)
is often difficult to quantify. Effective C^ is the net
result of the successful interaction of a complex
architecture that is comprised of people, procedures, and
equipment. This architecture may be transparent to the
various users (both commanders and the forces to be
commanded) in that as long as data may be conveyed to the
decision makers and orders may be conveyed back to
appropriate units, the users easily forget about the
complexity of the process that has just transpired. [Ref.
l:p. 55] Sadly, serious attention to the C^ process seems
to come to light only on the occasion of catastrophic C^
failure. Perhaps the most infamous such failure in modern
military history is the gross mishandling of intercepted
Japanese diplomatic message traffic that could have served
to alert the U.S. Pacific Fleet and prevent the tremendous
losses that were sustained on that day at Pearl Harbor.
Three further examples of C^ failures reveal the dire
consequences that poor C^ may have.
1. USS Libertv (AGTR-5)
At the time of the outbreak of hostilities between
Israel and the United Arab Republic on 5 June 1967, USS
Liberty was under the operational command of Commander in
Chief Europe. At 0001 7 June, USS Liberty came under the
control of Commander, 6th Fleet. At the time of her
operational control transfer, USS Liberty was directed to
remain at least 12 . 5 nautical miles from the United Arab
Republic coast and 6.5 nautical miles from Israel.
Following the outbreak of hostilities, standing orders for
all ships assigned to 6th Fleet had been modified to forbid
approaches of less than 100 nautical miles from either
country. The error in USS Liberty 's positioning was noticed
in the afternoon of 7 June and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) transmitted the first of fiye messages ordering the
repositioning of the ship. At 1210 8 June, USS Liberty .
still haying receiyed none of the warning messages, was
attacked by Israeli aircraft. Shortly afterwards she was
torpedoed by Israeli surface units. In all, 34 men were
killed and 75 were wounded. The ship was so seyerely
damaged that repair was impossible. [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-14]
A Nayal Court of Inquiry was conyened to
inyestigate the attack on USS Liberty and, among several
findings, stated the following:
Liberty 's position at the time of the attack had been
previously ordered changed farther to seaward by the
JCS; however, the messages relating to these changes
were not known to the ship before the attack took
place; and
The combination and compounding of many delayed
communication deliveries related to the Liberty
incident denied the ship the benefit of command
decisions actually made prior to the attack which,
among other things, would have caused the ship, as a
minimum, to be heading further off shore from her 1200
8 June actual position. [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-15]
2. USS Pueblo (AGER-2)
USS Pueblo was a U.S. Navy "auxiliary general
environmental research vessel utilized for intelligence
collection." [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-15] On 23 January 1968, the
Pueblo was off the coast of North Korea when it was
approached by a North Korean vessel. Through flag hoist
communications the North Korean vessel instructed Pueblo
"heave to or I will fire." USS Pueblo transmitted a flash
precedence message to inform the JCS of her situation. The
message was received by the JCS two hours, 34 minutes later.
Continuing delays slowed the second flash transmission from
Pueblo which informed the JCS that she had been seized by
the North Korean forces. This second message reached the
JCS one hour, 39 minutes after its transmission from
Pueblo . These inexcusably slow transmissions were via the
Defense Communications System. Additionally, parallel
transmission was initiated for both messages on the
CRITICOMM (Critical Communications) network. Though the
CRITICOMM system delivered the two messages in rapid
fashion, the actual introduction of the messages into the
network was too late for advantage to be taken of the
quicker transmission times. As a result, the Pueblo was
seized by North Korean forces without any opposition from
the United States. [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-16]
A Naval Court of Inquiry was convened to
investigate the seizure of the Pueblo . Findings of that
investigation stated that message transmission delays were
"grossly excessive" and that these delays were "at least
partially responsible for the failure of U.S. forces to come
to the aid of that ship". More explicitly, the message
delays and subsequent lack of response led to the "death of
one sailor, the long imprisonment of the remainder of the
crew and the loss of the vessel" and that the "capture of
USS Pueblo resulted in a serious compromise of our Nation's
intelligence capability." [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-18]
The loss and long delays of the messages
transmitted from both USS Liberty and USS Pueblo could not
be attributed to disabled communication facilities, enemy
jamming, or any restriction upon the use of any mode of
available communications. [Ref. l:p. 6010-A-19] Instead,
in these instances, broken down command and control held
sole responsibility.
3. Operation URGENT FURY
The arena with which the modern military must
contend is defined by computer systems and communication
systems of growing complexity, of the unstable and ever-
changing influence of world politics, and the capabilities
or limitations of man himself. Clearly, the problem of
providing effective and reliable command and control is
greater today than ever. The confusion that comes hand in
hand with joint operations may be overwhelming. A
contemporary example of this may be seen in Operation URGENT
FURY or, by its better known name, the Grenada Campaign.
This operation involved Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps elements and was generally proclaimed to be
successful in its stated mission objectives. [Ref. 2:p. 17,
Ref. 3:p. 3 51] However, well publicized instances of
coordination difficulties at the onset of the operation
reveal that even successful operations are not without
command and control concerns. Blame for coordination
problems has been placed on the Navy's inability to maintain
satellite communications. [Ref. 2:p. 17] Another scathing
analysis of URGENT FURY states:
It is ridiculous for each of the four services to have
different radio frequencies for controlling air-to-
ground strikes. During the initial days of the Grenada
operation, Army ground units had to send calls for air
strikes back to their headquarters in Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. The messages would then be relayed via
satellite to the Navy commander, who passed the
requests on to the air controller aboard the aircraft
carriers. [Ref. 4:p. 178]
Much of the information on the Grenada Campaign remains
classified thus an accurate depiction of the actual command
and control issues of that campaign cannot be examined in
this thesis. However, one may rest assured that in any
operation, whether single-service or joint, command and
control issues will be in the forefront.
B. THE EFFECT OF COMMUNICATIONS
There are similarities among the preceding examples of
command and control failures. The most obvious similarity
is that the failures were attributed to deficiencies in the
respective communication networks. The close relationship
that exists between command, control, and communications is
the aspect of C^ that is most widely discussed and, for that
reason, has earned its own name of C-^ . In fact, in the
multitudinous writings on the topic of C^ , it is easy to
forget that command and control itself is the real issue
while communications is the means to the end of the C^
process. The study of the effect of communications on C^ is
important in that, as four historical examples have shown,
command and control is only as effective as its weakest link
is strong.
C. CONTINUING C^ ISSUES
While few would deny that effective command and control
is essential to any successful military operation, the fact
remains that it is difficult to find proponents willing to
fund extensive research or modernization in the area of C^
.
In the world of shrinking military budgets, C^ is losing out
to more apparent weapon systems and platforms. The inherent
intangibility of the C^ process is simply no match for the
tangibility of ships, tanks, aircraft, and missiles. More
eloquently stated:
Warriors and those who would like to be associated with
them will argue simplistically that the enemy is killed
by effective employment of firepower; not by throwing
at him radios, computers, black boxes or analytic tools
for battle staffs, despite all of their usefulness.
[Ref. 5:p. 22]
The difficulty in finding advocacy for command and control
systems may be due, in part, to their very "transparent"
nature. [Ref. l:p. 55] However, regardless of the reason,
it is the wise student of command and control who remembers
that despite the undeniable benefit of effective C^
,
patronage is difficult to find.
D. PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to provide its
readers with a basic understanding of command and control as
it pertains to the American military establishment. The
scope of the thesis is intentionally broad to offer a good
introduction to the myriad issues and fields of study that,
taken together, allow the understanding of command and
control and permit the ultimate development of C^
architectures
.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
A. FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS
1. Commemd and Control
The key to understanding the complex phenomena of
command and control is establishing a clear and concise
definition for command and control, and its associated
terminology. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS
Pub 1) provides the basic definition of command and control.
Command and control is the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
[Ref. 7:p. 77]
This simple and straightforward definition is the Armed
Forces standard for defining C^ . No additional interpreta-
tion should be read into what is stated. Acceptable
alternatives for the term command and control are C^ (C-
squared) or C2 . Command represents the vested "authority
that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment." [Ref.
7: p. 76] Control is typically associated with the
commander's direction of forces. When used in the context
of C^, control is defined as operational control which
according to JCS Pub 1, is considered synonymous with the
term operational command. The term control therefore
represents:
those functions of command involving the composition of
subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the desig-
nation of objectives, and the authoritative direction
necessary to accomplish the mission.... [Ref. 7:p. 262]
A properly designated commander is the individual placed in
command in accordance with the laws and the Constitution of
the United States. The definition of C^ also stipulates the
following:
command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling
forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission. [Ref. 7:p. 77]
2 . Command and Control System
The second most important and fundamental defini-
tion is for the term command and control system. A command
and control system consists of:
The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,
and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned
forces pursuant to the missions assigned. [Ref. 7:p.
77]
At this point, it is critical to realize that the term Q?-
system describes the C^ system as a whole. It is an all
encompassing term used to describe all the elements and
aspects involved in a commander's execution of command and
control. C^ system includes all the processes, inter-
relationships, and inter-dependencies of all the components
and subsystems relating to command and control. It is
crucial to understand and accept the fact that anything that
relates to C^ , either currently existing or developed
through technology advances in the future, is still only a
part of the C^ system. Students of C^ should bear this in
mind when they encounter these other popular terms which are
often used throughout literature and among the C^ "experts"
of the Department of Defense: command, control, and
communications (C-^) ; command, control, and communication
system (C-^ system) ; command, control, communications, and
computers (C^) ; command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C^I) ; and command, control, communications,
intelligence, and interoperability (C^I^) [Ref. 8:p. 23].
Why not C^I^? The problem is that all the terms above, and
those not yet devised, are used interchangeably to represent
C^ or the C^ system. In actuality, each term is merely a
focused and limited description of component parts of the C^
system, which is clearly defined in JCS Pub 1. Figure 1
attempts to present a hierarchical description of the
relationships among C^ terminology.
The fundamental problem facing the 0?- community is
the lack of an agreement or understanding of exactly what is
meant by the variety of terms used, or more readily misused,
to describe C^ and the C^ system. Overall, the plethora of
terms used throughout the community usually involves terms
referring only to some subsystem of the overall C^ system,
and the terms rarely describe the command and control
process, a process which is as "old as war itself." [Ref.
9:p. 1] The term "command and control means many things to
10
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many people, and definitions range widely even among
veteran policy developers, analysts, designers, vendors,
purchasers and users." [Ref. 10: p. 2] Most experts of the
C^ community loosely use the term and its derivatives to
serve parochial interests. No accepted glossary of terms
exists within the Department of Defense other than those
provided by JCS Pub 1, which is inadequate for trying to
clarify the many terms being used. The lack of a consensus
on just what command and control is has led to a diversity
of efforts by the technical community [Ref. ll:p. 880]. As
this diversity of effort evolved C^ systems, it also gave
birth to the many parochial descriptions of C^
.
One of the least controversial things that can be said
about command and control is that it is controversial,
poorly understood, and subject to wildly different
interpretations. The term can mean almost everything
from military computers to the art of generalship:
whatever the user wishes it to mean. [Ref. 8:p. 23]
A suitable starting point must be established in
order to study and to understand the complex world of
command and control, its process, and its system. The key is
a simple approach to the terminology associated with command
and control. As presented earlier, JCS Publication 1
provides that starting point in its clear and concise
definition of command and control.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
Command and control is a process which has existed
since the beginning of warfare; its concept and true meaning
12
have not changed. What has changed drastically through
technology is the command and control system that supports
the commander and his process of command and control. The
command and control of Armed Forces is not new; however,
"...its dimensions have grown exponentially in modern
times, especially since 1939." [Ref. 9:p. 1] The evolution
of high technology command and control systems has brought
about new perspectives of the nature of command and control.
A variety of science and engineering disciplines have at-
tempted to remove some of the complexity of these systems by
trying to automate and improve the means by which commanders
exercise command and control. As the C^ systems evolved, so
have a variety of definitions for the term command and
control
.
The command and control process "in essence, is the
process of making, disseminating, and implementing informed
command decisions in order to obtain optimum effectiveness
of the nation's military forces in peace time, crisis,
conflict, or war." [Ref. 12 :p. 9] The C^ process consists
of three major functional areas: information management,
decision management, and execution management. [Ref. 13 :p.
3] These areas incorporate the four fundamental functions
of the command and control process: observe, orient, decide,
act (0-0-D-A) . In 1981, these functions were presented in a
briefing to the Air War College by Colonel John Boyd in his
work, Patterns of Conflict [Ref. 8:p. 97]. The functions
13
are driven by the state of the environment which the Or
process is attempting to manipulate. Figure 2 represents
Boyd's 0-0-D-A loop structure, which provides the basic
relationships of the functions of the C^ process. [Ref.
8:p. 26]
The most important functional area of the process is
the decision management area, whose product is the
commander's decision. Therefore, the essential element of
the C^ process is the commander/decision maker. Decision
making is the essence of the C^ process. Decisions are
usually made under conditions of great uncertainty, stress,
and critical time constraints. [Ref. 14 :p. 14] The
commander's objective is to reduce the uncertainty about the
environment to aid him in making the best decisions. [Ref.
15:p. 117]
From Plato to NATO, the history of command (and
control) in war consists of an endless quest for
certainty-certainty about the state and intentions of
the enemy's forces; certainty about the manifold
factors that together constitute the environment in
which the war is fought, from the weather and the
terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical
warfare agents; and, last but definitely not least,
certainty about the state, intentions, and activities
of one's own forces. [Ref. 9:p. 264]
Another problem with trying to make the best decision is
that the correct decision for one situation may not be the
best for another due to the stochastic nature of combat.
Combat is not a deterministic process dependent only on a





forces greatly affects the outcomes of the battles. The
commander's decisions do not always determine the actual
results of combat, and because of the probabilistic or
stochastic nature of combat, the commander "is only
influencing the probability of outcomes rather than directly
controlling outcomes." [Ref. 8: p. 47] "Warfare is two-
sided, and outcomes depend on decisions made by many
commanders on both sides." [Ref. 15: p. 117]
Compounding the problem, technological C^ systems and
modern warfare have placed the commander "at a distance both
from the phenomena on which he bases his decisions, and from
the people whom he will task to execute them." [Ref. 15: p.
11] Because the commander must rely on the C^ system to
provide the information to make decisions as well as the
means to execute decisions, the commander needs some control
over the structure and the procedures of the C^ system. The
structure, however, is usually established by a previous
commander or a superior commander. Most C^ systems are
designed to support several commanders. [Ref. 15 :p. 13] An
important concern for the commander is to assure that the C^
system does not control his C^ process. A commander must
understand the C^ system he acquires and manipulate the
system to meet his needs, his C^ process. To do this, the
commander must determine the needs for the variety of
different situations he may face. "The key to success in
combat is identifying foreseeable combat situations and
thinking them through in order to create plans to deal with
them." [Ref. 15 :p. 25] The commander must establish the
"arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures" to serve the needs of his
command and control process.
The information management functional area of the C^
process consists primarily of inputs from the observe
function. Observations of the environment are made through
a myriad of sensors ranging from human intelligence (HUMINT)
and active surveillance systems to the perceptions of
subordinate commanders. The commander "requires a network
of information flow from sensors and reporting commanders
through a process of correlation, filtering, and analysis
that converts data into information, and information into
knowledge." [Ref. 15: p. 117] Inputs are also received from
higher levels of authority providing guidance and direction
sometimes reflecting national policy objectives, depending
on the level of command and nature of conflict.
The ability of the C^ system to provide complete and
accurate information in a timely manner will significantly
impact how well a commander can perform the orient function.
This function actually leads to a situation assessment of
what is occurring in the environment. Because of the
complex nature of the C^ processes occurring at each level
of the C^ system, the information received by the commander
can already be distorted by the perceptions of subordinate
17
commanders. Based on the information received, the com-
mander must determine an estimate of the situation.
Objectives and courses of action (COAs) must be formed.
Decisions are made, and the final function of the cycle,
act, can occur. [Ref. 9: p. 7]
The act function is a function of the execution
management process and is a result of the decisions made
based on the planning of alternative COAs. The orders must
be transmitted to the proper forces for execution, and the
orders must be clearly understood. The C^ system must also
provide a feedback system to monitor the proper execution of
commands. The allocation of resources is also an output of
the decision making process. Once the execution has
occurred, the cyclic process then repeats itself. Although
simplified in this discussion, the command and control
process is continuous and must perform these fundamental
functions throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.
[Ref. 9:p. 7] The conceptual architecture of the C^
process discussed in Chapter VII presents a more detailed
description of the C^ process.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The primary mission of the C^ system is to meet the
needs of the commander. "The C^ system is a combination of
elements that form a complex whole." [Ref. 11 :p. 880] The
system must permit the commander to have full use of all his
resources in order to effectively and efficiently employ
18
military forces throughout the spectrum of conflict. [Ref.
14 :p. 10] Figure 3 depicts the C^ system supporting the
commander and his C^ process.
The three categories of information associated with the
C^ system are: friendly status, enemy status, and
environmental status. The C^ system must be able to perform
five basic functions regarding information: collect, process
display, disseminate, and retain. [Ref. 16] The Defense
Science Board Task Force on Command and Control Systems
Management describes the C^ system this way:
. . .effective command and control systems— support
systems that aid the commander in the exercise of his
command... a command and control system supporting a
commander is not just a computer with its associated
software and displays; it is not just communication
links; and it is not even just all the information
processing and fusion that must go in any well-designed
and well-operating command and control system. It is
all the above and much more. The ideal command and
control system supporting a commander is such that the
commander knows what goes on, that he receives what is
intended for him, and that what he transmits is
delivered to the intended addressee, so that the
command decisions are made with confidence and are
based on information that is complete, true, and up-to-
date. The purpose of a command and control system is,
in the end, to provide assurance that orders are
received as originally intended with follow-up in a
timely fashion, which can make the difference between
winning and losing wars. [Ref. 12 :p. 12]
The official definition for C^ system divides the system
into five basic subsets: communications, personnel, procedu-
res, facilities, and equipment. [Ref. 7:p. 77]
Communications is the most dominant subsystem of the
entire C^ system, but not necessarily the most important.
Modern warfare technology has changed the battlefield
19
COMMANDER
• exercises command & control
through the C2 process
C^ SYSTEM
- supports & aids the commander
- supports the commander's C2 process
- includes:
• communications • facilities • execution forces • space systems
• personnel • computers • staffs • tactics
• proceaures • intelligence • subordinate commanders • doctrine
equipment • interoperability • decision aids • strategy
• sensors • others
Figure 3
.
C^ System Supports the Commander
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boundaries dramatically. The battles of today cover large
expanses of goegraphy, and the weapons can assault the enemy
without ever seeing him. Communications have permitted C^
to keep pace with technology. The difficulties of command
and control of modern armies over large areas require
capable communication systems to allow for effective and
efficient control of forces. In early warfare, the
limitations of communications "kept armies fairly small in
size, the battlefields fairly small in area, and the
battles fairly short in duration." [Ref. 17 :p. 17] Even as
empires amassed larger armies, the lack of effective
communications to control them "reduced them to little more
than armed mobs." [Ref. 17: p. 17] The technological
advances of communications since World War II have allowed
commanders to maintain the ability to exercise command and
control over large modern armies and modern weaponry on
battlefields far removed from the physical location of the
commander. The significant contribution of communications
into the C^ system has spawned the popular term C-^ or C3
.
Communications are the link between the commander and all
the other components of the C^ system. The term C-^ system
describes only the communications subsystems which are a
part of the overall C^ system. Although frequently used to
refer to the C^ system, it is not a representation of the
entire system.
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The next subset of the C^ system is the personnel. The
personnel are perhaps the most important component of the
system because the human element is both the weakest and
most complex part. Without the "man-in-the-loop, " the
process of command and control, as we know it, would not
exist. The commander and his assigned forces are part of
the c2 system [Ref. 15:p. 118] as well as users of it. In
addition to the primary commander in the C^ system and the
execution forces, man provides many inputs to the C^ system
at all levels. The man-machine interface is critical to the
overall success of the C^ system. "No matter how good the
final... (C^) system is, it is reliant on the human
interface for initial input and for final decision making."
[Ref. 18 :p. 30] These inputs are directly affected by the
decision making process of the individual and the
individual's perception, right or wrong, of the information
or data he has. If these individuals are not properly
trained or they are adversely affected by the confusion of
combat, often referred to as the "fog of war", the C^ system
will not adequately serve the commander. This was sadly
demonstrated in July 1988 when USS Vincennes shot down an
Iranian airliner, which was incorrectly perceived to be an
attacking jet aircraft during combat hostilities in the
Persian Gulf. Expert system and artificial intelligence
technology is attempting to remove man from the loop
wherever feasible, but it is not an easy problem to solve.
In contrast, keen perception and ingenuity of reporting
subordinates that can often make the difference in warfare
cannot be easily replaced by a systematic machine process.
The equipment and facilities of the C^ system are
comprised of all the components which are not part of
communications or personnel. They include sensing,
processing, computing, and displaying equipment as well as
all the facilities to operate and maintain the equipment.
The often overlooked component is the logistics support not
only for guns and bullets, but "everything an army needs to
exist— its food supply, its sanitary services, its system
of military justice, and so on." [Ref. 9:p. 6]
Computers have become a key piece of equipment in
support of the command and control process. The evolution
of computer technology within the C^ system has been so
significant that it has prompted the call for another of the
many terms of C^ to be adopted: C'* . In May 1987, Lieutenant
General Emmett Paige, Jr., then Commanding General U. S.
Army Information Systems Command, stated:
I believe that it is time to add computers as the
fourth "C" to C^I and get on with the job that must be
done to bring the communications and automation
business areas together. [Ref. 19:p. 56]
General Paige is absolutely correct in insisting that
automation by computers needs to be emphasized, but there is
no need to introduce another term to include computers,
which are already a part of the C2 system description. The
computer's role in C^ is constantly evolving. Computers
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presently perform the following functions: 1) sensor and
communication network automation; 2) correlation, filtering,
and analysis of information regarding the enemy; 3) main-
taining the status and location of friendly forces; 4)
determining optimal deployment plans and their feasibility;
and 5) evaluating battle plans and outcomes of engagements.
Computer automation has greatly increased the commander's
ability to collect and process immense amounts of data.
This capability significantly enhances the commander's
decision making process. However, if the proper procedures
and processes are not performed, the commander will quickly
become saturated with information. It is important to
realize that computers are only as good as their application
programs and their input data. If the programs are
inadequate, or the data inaccurate, then the outputs are
unreliable and usually invalid. Again, the influence of the
man-in-the-loop significantly impacts the C^ system's
utilization of computers. Computers, computer security, and
operating system interoperability pose tremendous and
exciting challenges to the C^ community and to the future of
highly capable C^ systems. [Ref. 15:pp. 83-85]
The procedures in the C^ system include all the pro-
cedures used in the planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling of the assigned forces in the accomplishment of
assigned missions. These procedures can be promulgated by
the commander who has the responsibility of performing the
tasks stated, or by pre-determined standard operating
procedures. This perhaps is where the military leadership
style of the commander is most prevalent. The commanders
have various degrees of flexibility in their "choices
concerning the ways to employ available technical means
within the military command (and control) structure." [Ref.
8:p. 87] The commander also has the flexibility to
determine what information he receives, and often the format
and speed at which he receives it.
The modern C^ system is a complex and constantly
evolving system of technological and procedural advances
rooted by the fundamental functions of command and control.
To grasp a sound understanding of the C^ system requires the
study of a wide variety scientific fields including: human
factors, social sciences, psychology, organizational theory,
leadership, communication engineering, computer sciences,
operations analysis, behavioral sciences and others. [Ref.
8:p. 32]
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF A C^ SYSTEM
Six basic system characteristics are required to enable
the Q?- system to perform its mission of aiding the commander
in the exercise of command and control. These C^ system
characteristics include: 1) reliability, 2) survivability,
3) flexibility, 4) responsiveness, 5) interoperability, and
6) user-orientation. [Ref. 14 :p. 22]
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1. Reliability— Reliability is defined by JCS Pub 1
as the "ability of an item to perform a required function
under stated conditions for a specified period of time."
[Ref. 7:p. 305] High mean time between failures (MTBFs) for
equipment and the reduction of the causes of fatigue for
personnel are critical in assuring C^ system reliability.
The system must be designed to perform in wartime as well as
peacetime. [Ref. 14 :p. 22]
2. Survivability— A C^ system must possess the
robustness to withstand enemy attacks across the entire
spectrum of conflict. It must have the "potential for
graceful degradation." [Ref. 12 :p. 12] The loss of part of
the system cannot result in the catastrophic loss of the
entire system. The ability to continue to provide the
commander with the essential elements to conduct effective
C^ can be achieved through a variety of measures which
include: hardening, mobility, redundancy, dispersal, and
distributed networking [Ref. 14:p. 22].
3. Flexibility— A C^ system must possess the ability
to adapt to quickly changing environments and a wide range
of operations. The commander must be allowed to manipulate
the system quickly and with relative ease in order to meet
the requirements of the missions assigned within the
constraints of higher authority. [Ref. 14 :p. 22] The
system must be flexible to evolutionary changes enabling it
to keep pace with advances in state of the art technology.
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Modifications of portions of the system should not adversely
affect the operation of the whole system.
4. Responsiveness— A C^ system must respond quickly
and accurately to provide the commander with essential
information in a timely manner. In crisis situations, time
becomes the critical factor. Time-late information is
useless information.
5. Interoperability— Interoperability of C^ systems
and subsystems is critical to the success of military
operations, especially in joint and combined operations.
The C^ system must go beyond compatibility and achieve
interoperability [Ref. 15:p. 70]. As defined in JCS Pub 1,
compatibility is merely the ability to "function in the same
system or environment without mutual interference," while
interoperability is "the ability of systems, units, or
forces to provide services to and accept services from other
systems, units or forces and to use them to operate
effectively together." [Ref. 7:pp. 82,192]
6. User-orientation— A C^ system must be designed for
the user. The commander must have useable information
presented or displayed in a clear, unambiguous format; and
it should not require elaborate interpretation. This
characteristic is critical at all levels of the system.
Information must be entered just as efficiently and
effectively as it is extracted. [Ref. 14 :p. 22]
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E. SUMMARY
Establishing a fundamental understanding of the
definition of command and control, and the command and
control system, is the key to understanding the
organizations and operations of complex command and control
structures. Chapter III describes the command and control
structure of the United States military organization
including: the Department of Defense, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed
Services, and the Unified and Specified Commands.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. HISTORY
The first move to reorganize the military forces of the
United States under one department began in the closing
months of World War II. The war itself revealed the need
for some form of consolidated military department to be
placed under the direction of a cabinet-level secretary.
The National Security Act of 1947 was the first piece of
legislation to bring about this organizational change. The
act created the National Military Establishment (NME) and
placed this entity under the control of a civilian
secretary. The act also created "co-equal" cabinet-level
secretaries for the newly established Departments of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. [Ref. 20:p. 27]
Several amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
have been legislated. Among these is the Reorganization Act
of 1958 which asserted the "direction, authority, and
control of the Secretary of Defense" over the newly named
Department of Defense (DOD) and defined the operational
chain of command to run "from the President and the
Secretary of Defense to the combatant forces." [Ref. 20 :p.
27]




- To support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
- To ensure, by timely and effective military action, the
security of the United States, its possessions, and
areas vital to its interest; and
- To uphold and advance the national policies and
interests of the United States. [Ref. 21: p. 3]
B. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DOD REORGANIZATION ACT
Numerous suggestions for organizational reform for the
DOD have been made in the years since the Reorganization Act
of 1958. These suggestions have been made both by senior
military members and official investigative bodies. The
culmination of all these forums was appointed in July 1985
by then President Reagan. Chaired by David Packard, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the commission became known as
the Packard Commission. It was tasked to "conduct a study
of the entire defense management organization, including
budget, procurement, legislative oversight, organization,
and operational arrangements." [Ref. 21:pp. 141-142] The
commission's most publicized finding stated:
Today, there is no rational system whereby the
Executive Branch and the Congress reach coherent and
enduring agreement on national military strategy, the
forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be
provided— in light of the overall economy and competing
claims on national resources. [Ref. 21: p. 142]
The commission proposed that sweeping changes be made within
the DOD. With regard to command and control, these changes
may be summarized simply as increased authority for the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) , increased authority
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for combatant conunanders, and increased influence and
prestige for the Joint Staff. [Ref. 21:p. 143]
The need for change was recognized by Congress and
legislated through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The act was signed as
Public Law 99-433 on 1 October 1986. [Ref. 22:p. 1032] The
expressed intent of Congress in the enactment of this Act
was manifold:
To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen
civilian authority in the Department;
To improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense;
To place clear responsibility on the commanders of
unified and specified combatant commands for the
accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
To ensure that the authority of the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands is fully
commensurate with the responsibility of those
commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned
to their commands;
To increase attention to the formulation of strategy
and to contingency planning;
To provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
To improve joint officer management policies; and
To enhance the effectiveness of military operations
and improve the management and administration of the
Department of Defense. [Ref. 22:pp. 1034-1035]
The major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act pertaining
to command and control involve specific changes in the role
and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
of the added authority given to the combatant commanders
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(CINCs) , the establishment of the position of Vice-chairman,
and modifications made to the role of the Joint Staff.
[Ref. 21:p. 144]
The current organization of the Department of Defense
is depicted in Figure 4. [Ref. 20: p. 29] The operational
chain of command runs from the President through the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the unified and specified
combatant commanders. DOD Directive 5100.1 dated 25
September 1987 [Ref 21] places the CJCS in the communication
chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the
combatant commanders. [Ref. 20:p. 42] The administrative
chain of command includes the military departments. These
departments (Department of the Army, Department of the Navy,
and Department of the Air Force) are under the control of
civilian secretaries who supervise the service chiefs in
matters which are of a "service nature" but not
operationally related. The civilian secretaries were
removed from the operational chain of command by the
Reorganization Act of 1958. The basic function of the
department secretaries is to oversee the areas of
recruitment, supply, training, mobilization/demobilization,
and the construction/outfitting and repair of equipment and
buildings. [Ref. 20:p. 30]
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C. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)
1. History
The JCS came into being as the result of the need
for "coordinated staff work" during World War II. The
original JCS was based upon the British Chiefs of Staff
Committee and the original members of the JCS were parallel
to the members of the British organization. This first
organization was developed "without legislative sanction" or
"formal Presidential definition." At the end of the war the
need for formal definition was determined. The National
Security Act of 1947 established the JCS as a permanent
agency and designated the JCS as the principal military
advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Modifications to the structure of the JCS have been made
since its inception, the latest being the changes imposed by
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. [Ref. 20:pp. 31-33]
2. The JCS Today
Today the JCS is comprised of the Chairman, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps. The Vice-chairman is the second ranking
member of the Armed Forces. He is not a member of the JCS
but may participate in all meetings. He votes on matters
before the JCS only when acting in the capacity of the
Chairman. The JCS exerts no executive authority to the
command combatant forces. Specifically, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act states the "Secretaries of the military
departments shall assign all forces under their
jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to
perform missions assigned to those commands...." Also,
while the Chairman is the chief military advisor to the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council (NSC) , current law allows all members of the JCS to
respond to a request or to voluntarily submit advice or
opinions to the President, the SECDEF, or the NSC. [Ref.
20:pp. 33-34]
3. Role and Function of the Chairman
The Goldwater-Nichols Act did much to expand the
role of the Chairman. Specifically, the functions of the
Chairman include the following:
Furnish strategic direction of the Armed Forces;
- Prepare strategic plans, joint logistics and mobility
plans and net assessments of the capabilities of the
Armed Forces;
Provide for the preparation and review of contingency
plans and advise on critical deficiencies and strengths
in force capabilities;
Advise on the priorities of requirements, program
recommendations and budget proposals and assess
military requirements for defense acquisition programs;
and
Develop doctrine for joint employment and formulate
policies for coordinating military education and
training. [Ref. 20:p. 35]
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D. UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
1. History
Again, World War II proved to be the catalyst for
redefinition of basic components within the existing
military system. "The complexity of modern warfare" had
brought about the need for a "unified command arrangement."
The National Security Act of 1947 directed the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to "establish unified commands in strategic areas"
and for the President to "establish unified and specified
combatant commands to perform military missions." [Ref.
20 :p. 42] The official JCS definitions of these two
entities are:
Unified Command— A command with a broad continuing
mission under a single commander and composed of
significant assigned components of two or more
services, and which is established and so designated by
the President, through the Secretary of Defense with
the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
or, when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by
a commander of an existing unified command established
by the President. [Ref. 7:p. 384]
Specified Command-- A command that has a broad
continuing mission and that is established and so
designated by the President through the Secretary of
Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces
from but one service. [Ref. 7:p. 340]
The operational chain of command as decreed by the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act runs from the President
through the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. The CJCS is
within a communication chain of command between the SECDEF
and the CINCs. [Ref. 20: p. 42] Today there are eight
unified commands and two specified commands. All of the
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unified commands contain a service component command from
each service.
2. Command Authority of Combatant Commanders
Unified and specified commanders are invested by
law with Operational Command (OPCOM) authority defined as:
The authority to perform those functions of command
involving the composition of subordinate forces,
assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the
mission. [Ref. 24:p. 3-9]
OPCOM is not shared with other echelons of command. CINCs
exercise OPCOM only through service component commanders,
functional component commanders, subordinate unified
commanders, commanders of single-service forces, and
commanders of joint task forces. [Ref. 20 :p. 42] OPCOM
grants the CINCs the authority to accomplish the following
tasks
:
Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands
and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to
command, including authoritative direction over all
aspects of military operations, joint training, and
logistics;
Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and
forces within the command;
Organize commands and forces within that command as is
considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to
the command;
Employ forces within that command as is considered
necessary to carry out missions assigned to that
command
;
Assign command functions to subordinate commanders;
Coordinate and approve those aspects of administration,
support (including control of resources and equipment,
internal organization, and training) , and discipline
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necessary to carry out missions assigned to the
command ; and
Exercise the authority with respect to selecting
subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command
staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-
martial. [Ref. 21:pp. 8-9]
Another level of authority used by CINCs is
Operational Control (OPCON) . This authority is delegated to
echelons below that of the combatant commander. [Ref. 20 :p.
45] OPCON is defined as:
The authority delegated to a commander to perform those
functions of command over subordinate forces involving
the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment
of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the
mission. [Ref. 24:p. 3-9]
3. The Role of CJCS
Within the communication chain of command, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfills three roles.
First, the CJCS has the responsibility for communications
between the President and the Secretary of Defense and the
CINCs. This communication responsibility includes the
numerous duties associated with the direction and control of
combatant commanders, specifically: strategic direction,
strategic planning, and contingency planning and
preparedness. Second, CJCS retains oversight authority over
the activities of the unified and specified commands in
matters dealing with the "statutory responsibility of the
Secretary of Defense." This function includes the
recommendation of changes in the assignment of functions,
roles, and missions in order to achieve the maximum
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effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Third, the CJCS acts as
the spokesman for the CINCs providing summary and analysis
of requirements, programs, and budgets. [Ref. 20:pp. 45-46]
4. The Unified Commands
The eight unified commands are categorized in two
groups— commands based on function (U.S. Space Command,
U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation
Command) and commands based on geographic area (U.S. Pacific
Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S.
Southern Command, U.S. Central Command). The general
definition of a unified command was stated in section D.l.
of this chapter. The wide range of roles and missions
fulfilled by each of these commands requires that some time
be spent examining each in order to obtain a good working
knowledge of the Nation's military structure. The
relationships between the President, SECDEF, CJCS, and the
unified- and specified commands may be seen in Figure 5.
[Ref. 20:p. 41]
a. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM)
The first step towards development of a unified
space command was taken in the formation of the Air Force
Space Command in 1982 and the Naval Space Command in 1983.
The United States Space Command was established in September
1985. It was designated as a unified command whose mission
is "to support joint employment of military space related
forces and to ensure improved operational support to other
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unified commands." USSPACECOM headquarters are located at
Peterson AFB, Colorado. The service components of this
command are the Air Force Space Command at Colorado Springs,
Colorado; the Naval Space Command at Dahlgren, Virginia; and
the Army Space Command, also at Colorado Springs. [Ref.
25:pp. 44-45]
The three primary mission areas may be broadly
stated: space operations, surveillance and warning, and
ballistic missile defense planning. The space operations
aspect of this command's mission involves space control and
the direction of space support operations for its assigned
systems and operation of JCS designated space systems in
support of the President, SECDEF, JCS and other unified and
specified commands. [Ref. 25:p. 45]
b. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
The need for the ability to resolve low-
intensity conflict situations while still at relatively low
levels of violence has long been recognized. However,
serious recognition of the need for a dedicated special
operations organization did not occur until the Iranian
hostage rescue attempt that ended in tragedy in April 1980.
[Ref. 26:pp. 48-50] The U.S. Special Operations Command
came into being in April 1987, a direct result of the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. Some of the
functions of this unified command are:
To provide combat-ready special operations forces for
rapid reinforcement of the other unified commands;
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- To develop joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and
procedures for special operations forces;
To train assigned forces and ensure interoperability of
equipment and forces;
- To monitor the preparedness of special operations
forces assigned to the other unified commands;
- To develop and acquire unique special operations forces
equipment, material, supplies, and services; and
To be prepared to plan and conduct selected special
operations as directed by the President and/or SECDEF.
[Ref. 26:p. 51]
USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill AFB, Florida. The
service components of the Special Operations Command are the
Army's 1st Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina; the Air Force Special Operations Command at
Hurlburt Field, Florida; and the Naval Special Warfare
Command at Coronado, California. [Ref. 26:pp. 51-52]
c. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
The need for unifying the nation's mobility
forces was recognized in the years following World War II.
Serious attention to this matter was given following a 1978
command post exercise called Nifty Nugget. The exercise
simulated a blitzkrieg by the Warsaw Pact on NATO forces in
Europe. The exercise made clear the fact that the
transportation elements of U.S. forces were not coordinated.
The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) was formed in 1979 to
address this problem. The effectiveness of this agency was
limited, however, in that it served as a coordinating
authority only with no actual direction ability. The need
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for a single unified command to "integrate global air, land,
and sea transportation" was expressed in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. In October 1987, the U.S.
Transportation Command was formally activated. The Joint
Deployment Agency was disestablished and its functions and
responsibilities assumed by the Transportation Command.
[Ref. 27: pp. 53-56] The mission of the Transportation
Command is "to provide common-user airlift, sealift,
terminal services, and U.S. commercial air and land
transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain U.S. forces on
a global basis." The service components are the U.S. Air
Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) headquartered at
Scott AFB, Illinois; the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift
Command (MSC) headquartered at Washington, D.C.; and the
U.S. Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
headquartered at Falls Church, Virginia. [Ref. 27:p. 55]
d. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
The U.S. Pacific Command was established in
January 1947. Its original structure was based on the
unified command structure used during World War II. The
Pacific Command is the largest unified command spanning both
the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and includes the Asian
landmass. In this area lie the interests of the United
States, the Soviet Union, China, Korea, India, Japan, and
others. The Pacific Command is headquartered in Oahu,
Hawaii. The service component commands on Oahu are the U.S.
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Army Western Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the Pacific
Air Forces. The mission of this command is:
- To maintain the security of the command and defend the
United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean;
- To support and advance the national policies and
interests of the United States and discharge U.S.
military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East,
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indian Ocean; and
- To prepare plans, conduct operations, and coordinate
activities of the forces of the U.S. Pacific Command in
accordance with the directives of higher authority.
[Ref. 28;pp. 5-7]
e. U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)
The U.S. Atlantic Command was established
December 1947 and is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia.
The command is responsible for the geographic area
encompassing the Atlantic Ocean to the North and South Poles
and the Pacific Ocean west of Central America. Service
component commands of the Atlantic Command are Anny Forces
Atlantic, Air Forces Atlantic, and the Atlantic Fleet.
There are also two special commands. Joint Task Force 12
and Joint Task Force 140. These commands are directed to
"plan and conduct joint operations in specific areas."
[Ref. 29:pp. 28-31]
The Atlantic Command is primarily a maritime
command as reflected in its missions:
To maintain an unbroken link between Europe and North
America to ensure the safe and timely flow of
reinforcement and resupply shipping over the sea lines
of communication; and
To provide direct application of combat power in
support of the land campaign.
An additional requirement of USLANTCOM involves the U.S.
commitment to the NATO treaty which states that an attack on
any NATO ally is an attack against all of NATO. The
commitment of the United States to this treaty is evident in
the dual-hat of USCINCLANT and the Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic (SACLANT) . [Ref. 29:p. 28]
f. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
In the aftermath of World War II, the serious
threat to western nations by the Soviet Union prompted the
formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in 1949. Part of the American commitment to this new
organization was the establishment of the United States
European Command in 1952. The primary purpose of this
command was to "coordinate the U.S. military support for
NATO." [Ref. 30 :p. 12]
Today, USEUCOM covers an area ranging from the
north cape of Norway, through the Mediterranean and parts of
the Middle East to the southern tip of Africa. The command
is headquartered at Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of
Germany. The primary missions of the European Command
include:
Providing combat-ready forces to support U.S.
commitments to the NATO alliance;
- Unilateral and multilateral contingency planning
ranging from humanitarian relief in support of friendly
governments to military operations in support of U.S.
national interests;
Intelligence activities geared toward maintaining an
accurate picture of the Warsaw Pact threat; and
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Security assistance to help friendly nations protect
themselves from aggression and to contribute to
collective security. [Ref. 30:p. 17]
The Commander in Chief of the European Command
(USCINCEUR) is dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR) , reflecting the commitment of the U.S. Armed
Forces to NATO. The service components of USEUCOM are U.S.
Naval Command, Europe; U.S. Army Command, Europe; and U.S.
Air Force Command, Europe. [Ref. 20: p. 50]
g. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
The U.S. Southern Command is headquartered at
Quarry Heights, Panama and encompasses all of Central and
South America. The command is comprised of three service
components: U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Air Force, and
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command. [Ref. 30:p. 26] The
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH) is
the principal DOD representative in the region.
USCINCSOUTH, in conjunction with his service component
commands, has the mission to:
Provide for the defense of the Panama Canal and other
DOD obligations of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977;
Exercise operational command over U.S. forces in
Central and South America;
Prepare strategic assessments and contingency plans and
conduct training or operations as directed by the JCS
;
Conduct disaster relief, search and rescue or
evacuation of U.S. citizens from endangered areas; and
Promote mutual security and development among nations
of the region. [Ref. 30:p. 25]
h. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
The U.S. Central Command has become highly
visible during the past few years against the backdrop of
the turbulent and violent Persian Gulf arena. The command
is headquartered at MacDill AFB, Florida and controls U.S.
forces in an area ranging from Southwest Asia, the Middle
East, and East Africa. The component commands of USCENTCOM
are U.S. Army Central, U.S. Central Air Force, and U.S. Navy
Central Command. Additionally, due to the rapid and recent
increased presence and activities of U.S. military forces
within the region, Central Command has now been supplemented
with Joint Task Force Middle East. The commander of this
joint task force has "on-scene responsibility for all U.S.
operations in the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and Gulf
of Oman." The commander of this force reports directly to
the Commander in Chief of Central Command (USCINCCENT) and
his presence and that of his task force is intended to
strengthen the command and control of the Central Command.
[Ref. 31: pp. 36-41] The primary missions of USCENTCOM are:
Ensuring the unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait
of Hormuz
;
Supporting the right of free passage through other
international straits;
- Promoting the security, stability and cooperation of
the moderate states of the region; and
Limiting the influence and presence of the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 31:p. 36]
5. The Specified Commands
There are two specified commands— the Strategic
Air Command and the Forces Command.
a. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
Strategic Air Command was established in 1946
and is headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
The simply stated mission of the Strategic Air Command is to
provide the United States and her allies with a "nuclear
shield of deterrence against aggression." The United States
possesses a Triad of Strategic Forces which consists of sea
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) , intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) , and long-range, manned bombers.
The U.S. Navy maintains control over the SLBMs and the fleet
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) which carry them. The
Strategic Air Command controls the remaining two legs of the
Triad. [Ref. 33:pp. 59-61]
The primary mission of SAC is to add to
deterrence by providing "ready, flexible, and credible
strategic offense forces." The command maintains more than
2,000 aircraft and 1,000 ICBMs for the accomplishment of its
mission. The command supports a conventional mission by
providing the capability for delivering conventional
munitions via long-range bombers. Also of great importance
are the command's missions of aerial refueling and strategic
reconnaissance. [Ref. 33:pp. 61-63]
b. Forces Command (FORSCOM)
Another product of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD
Reorganization Act was the designation of Forces Command as
a specified command. FORSCOM was officially established in
July 1987. Though extremely new, much of the organization
and experience was readily attainable from the Army
components of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the now defunct
U.S. Readiness Command. [Ref. 34:p. 68]
Forces Command is the strategic land force
reserve for the Free World. Among its many missions are the
following:
Provide a general reserve of combat-ready ground forces
to reinforce other commands as directed;
- Plan for, and execute the land defense of the
continental United States including military support of
civil defense and protection of key assets;
- Plan for the land defense of Alaska (excluding the
Aleutians) ; and
Coordinate with Canadian Forces Mobile Command to plan
for the combined land defense of Canada and the United
States. [Ref. 34;p. 67]
E. JOINT COMMANDS AND COMBINED COMMANDS
Occasionally, some confusion arises with regard to the
definition and use of the terms "joint command" and
"combined command". Joint commands have been discussed in
this thesis as the unified and specified commands— that
is, commands incorporating the forces of two or more
services. A combined command is defined as a "force under a
single commander that is composed of sizable assigned or
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attached elements of two or more allied nations." The
command authority of combined commanders as well as the
missions and responsibilities of the combined command are
assigned to conform with the binational or multinational
treaties, alliances, or agreements between or among the
nations concerned. Examples of combined commands in
existence today include the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) , Combined Forces Command Korea (CFC) , and




The Department of Defense is, in itself, an extremely
complex organization. However, it is also part of an even
larger structure which will be explored in greater depth in
the next chapter— the National Command Structure.
rV. U.S. NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The National Command Structure of the United States is
undoubtedly the largest and most complex to be found in the
Free World. It incorporates the people, data, and processes
of dozens of widely diverse organizations and an accurate
depiction of its entire structure is well beyond the scope
of this text. However, there are various major components
and systems of this structure whose study offers a good
foundation on which to build a basic understanding of the
complex processes and interrelationships that produce and
support our National Command Structure. The intent of this
chapter is to introduce the reader to those major
components and systems.
B. NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES (NCA)
Perhaps the most important entity to understand within
the national defense command structure is that of the
National Command Authorities. The formal definition of the
actual composition of the NCA is "the President and the
Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or
successors." [Ref. 7:p. 243] The term National Command
Authorities signifies much more than that special
relationship between the President and SECDEF. Its use
represents the constitutionally guaranteed civilian
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authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense to
direct the Armed Forces in the execution of military action.
As directed by law, no one else or no other entity exists
which has the authority to direct the movement of troops or
the execution of any military action. [Ref. 20: p. 41] In
other words, the ultimate authority with regard to command
and control is the NCA. The relationships between the NCA,
JCS, and the unified and specified combatant commanders is
represented in Figure 5.
C. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) SYSTEM
1 . Background
The National Security Council System was
established by the National Security Act of 1947. The
purpose of the NSC is to act as the principal forum for the
consideration of national security issues which require
Presidential decision. The NSC develops its national
security policy based on the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies as they relate to national
security. The NSC possesses a statutory description as
defined by Congress. However, built-in flexibility to the
Council allows its composition, influence, and schedule of
meetings to vary with each President or to conform to the




There are four statutory members of the NSC: the
President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and
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the Secretary of Defense. The charter of the NSC also
provides for statutory advisors. These positions are filled
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) . [Ref. 20:p. 102]
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(the National Security Advisor) , in consultation with the
statutory members of the NSC, is responsible for the
development, coordination, and implementation of national
security policy as approved by the President as well as
responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the Council.
[Ref. 35 :p. 21] All meetings of the NSC are attended by the
statutory members and advisors as well as the National
Security Advisor. [Ref. 20:p. 102] Further, the President
may extend an invitation to attend NSC meetings to any
other individual he believes should be present.
Another mechanism developed to work within the NSC
to assist the individual members in the fulfillment of their
responsibilities is that of the interagency group. These




Consider the implications of agency programs for
foreign policy or overall national security policy; and
Undertake other activities as assigned by the NSC.
[Ref. 35:p. 22]
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Under the Reagan Administration, the following senior
interagency groups (SIGs) recommended, coordinated, and
monitored the implementation of national security policy:
the National Security Planning Group (a senior committee of
the NSC) ; the Senior Review Group (a cabinet-level
interagency group) ; and the Policy Review Group (a senior
sub-cabinet-level interagency group) . Additionally,
regional and functional interagency groups are sometimes
used to supplement the primary SIGs. These are the Senior
Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I) , the Senior
Interagency Group for Foreign Policy Formulation (SIG-FP)
,
and the Senior Interagency Group for Defense Policy
Formulation (SIG-DP) . [Ref. 20:pp. 102-103] The structure
and use of the SIGs as well as the entire National Security
Council System is dependent upon the needs of the President
and his administration. President Bush may well redefine
the NSC to suit the needs of his national security policy.
A simplified diagram of the U.S. Command Structure
may be seen in Figure 6. [Ref. 36:p. 105] All of the
major components in this diagram have been discussed thus
far in the thesis. Another highly important aspect of the
national command structure that remains to be discussed is
the means by which these major components interact and make
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55
D. WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS)
1. Definition
WWMCCS is defined as "the system that provides the
means for operational direction and technical administrative
support involved in the function of command and control of
U.S. military forces." [Ref. 24:p. 3-39] WWMCCS was
created with the intent of serving as a "system of systems
focusing on C^ capabilities within the context of day-to-day
operations, crisis management, theater war, and strategic
nuclear war." The WWMCCS system was meant to unify the
independent development of command, control, and
communication systems by the military services. [Ref. 37 :p.
55]
2. System Description
WWMCCS has the immense task of providing the
NCA, DOD, and Joint Chiefs of Staff with the ability to
plan, direct, and control the United States military forces
the world over. To accomplish this task WWMCCS employs
approximately sixty communication systems and thirty command
centers spread around the world. This system works to link
key government and military decision makers with the
nation's command structure. Today, the stated mission of
WWMCCS is the "command and control of globally-deployed U.S.
military forces during peacetime, crisis, and all phases of
a general war." [Ref. 38 :p. 122] WWMCCS consists of:
- The National Military Command System (NMCS)
;
The command and control systems of the unified and
specified commands;
The WWMCCS-related management/information systems of
the headquarters of the military departments;
The command and control systems of the headquarters of
the service component commands; and
- The command and control support systems of DOD
agencies. [Ref. 20:pp. 116-117]
In order to support the function of national-level command
and control, WWMCCS incorporates these five basic elements:
- Warning systems: the tactical warning systems that
notify operation command centers of the occurrence of a
threatening event;
- WWMCCS communications: including the general— and
special— purpose communication capabilities to convey
information, hold conferences, and issue orders;
Data collection and processing: the collection and
handling of data to support information requirements of
WWMCCS
;
Executive aids: WWNCCS-related documents, procedures,
reporting structure, and system interaction that permit
the user to connect with the system, enter data, and
receive output records, forms, and displays; and
WWMCCS command facilities: the primary or alternate
command centers. [Ref. 20:p. 117]
Because WWMCCS is not a single system but a system
of systems ranging from the national to the theater level,
there is a mechanism for users of one system to communicate
with users of other systems. This mechanism is the WWMCCS
Intercomputer Network (WIN) . Through this network users may
communicate with other users, review and update data at
other WWMCCS sites, and achieve accurate and rapid data
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transfer. WIN fulfills its functions through the use of a
Telecommunications Network (TELNET) , a File Transfer Service
(FTS) , and the WIN Teleconference (TLCF) System. [Ref
.
20:pp. 118-120]
3. WWMCCS Information System (WIS)
The most visible aspect of the Worldwide
Military Command and Control System and that which forms its
backbone is its automatic data processing (ADP) equipment
and supporting software. The critical nature of WWMCCS '
s
missions and its requirement to process data and display
information from around the globe in virtual real time
necessitates continual upgrade and evolution of the entire
system to enable it to handle both advances in technology
and increasing demands placed upon it. The WWMCCS
Information System is directed at correcting deficiencies in
the WWMCCS system by replacing and improving obsolescent ADP
equipment and software. [Ref. 38:p. 122] The WIS program
is intended to support the command and control requirements
of the NCA, combatant commanders, the JCS , and the
Department of Defense by providing the following
capabilities:
Transmission of timely and accurate information on the
status and location of forces and major resources;
Speedy development and implementation of operation
plans and options; and
Formulation and transmission of direction to, and
receipt and assessment of reports from appropriate
commands and organizations. [Ref. 20:pp. 260-261]
E. NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM (NMCS)
1. Definition
The highest level of command and control systems is
the National Military Command System. [Ref. 39 :p. 82] NMCS
is the component of WWMCCS that supports the NCA in the
exercise of their military command responsibilities. The
system is defined as being "a responsive, reliable, and
survivable system that relays the warning and intelligence





Major subscribers of the NMCS include the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) , the Alternate National
Military Command Center (ANMCC) , the National Emergency
Airborne Command Post (NEACP) , and other command centers
designated by the SECDEF. The NMCC, ANMCC, and NEACP will
be discussed in Chapter V. NMCS also serves as a
communication link between command centers and the combatant
commanders, service headquarters, and other commands and
agencies. [Ref. 20:pp. 120-121]
F. DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND THE JOINT PLAIWING
PROCESS
1. Introduction
Today's world of tight fiscal constraints renders
the management of defense resources a very important aspect
of command and control. VThile seemingly very administrative
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in nature, resources management is closely tied to the
operational capabilities of each of the services. Further,
as the capability for "joint interoperability" becomes more
and more important to military planners, the more tightly
knit defence resources management and the joint planning
process will become.
2. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
PPBS is a cyclic process containing the three
interrelated phases of planning, programming, and budgeting.
The process is intended to provide for decision making on
future programs and to permit that prior decisions be
examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current
environment (theater, political, economic, technological,
and resources). [Ref. 40:p. 3] In short, the PPBS produces
a plan, a program, and a budget for the DOD. [Ref. 20:p.
103] There are three documents that are specific to the
PPBS cycle and which directly effect other planning
processes
:
POM (Program Objective Memorandum) : The
recommendations of the service secretaries and heads of
DOD agencies to the SECDEF on proposed application of
their portion of DOD appropriations;
PDM (Program Decisions Memorandum) : Contains Defense
Resources Board decisions on the POMs that are
distributed to the DOD components and the Office of
Management and Budget as the basis for the Budget
Estimate Submission; and
- DG (Defense Guidance): The SECDEF 's guidance to the
services and defense agencies on the development of
their Program Objective Memorandum. [Ref. 20:pp. 332-
333]
3. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
The JSPS is the official means by which the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accomplishes the
following tasks:
Prepares strategic plans to conform to projected
resource levels;
Assists the President in giving strategic direction to
the Armed Forces
;
Reviews service programs and conducts risk assessments;
States the regional concerns of the combatant commands
in terms of a global perspective;
Sets guidance and apportions resources for contingency
planning;
Furnishes planning continuity for the strategic
planning process; and
- Submits input to the PPBS . [Ref. 20:p. 103]
The JSPS utilizes the following six documents to accomplish
its tasks:
JSAM (Joint Security Assistance Memorandum) : Contains
views of the CJCS on funding levels projected for the
U.S.— financed Security Assistance Program, security
assistance manning levels, development of Special
Defense Acquisition Fund procurement and priorities,
and key arms transfer policy matters.
JPAM (Joint Program Assessment Memorandum) : Gives
views of the CJCS on the adequacy and capabilities of
the total forces contained in the service Program
Objective Memorandums (ROMs) to execute the national
military strategy and the risks inherent in those force
capabilities.
JSPD (Joint Strategic Planning Document) : Contains the
advice of the CJCS to the NCA and NSC on the military
strategy and force structure required to attain U.S.
national security objectives. It is the principal JCS
input to the Defense Guidance (EX3) .
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JIEP (Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning)
:
Contains estimative intelligence on possible worldwide
situations that would affect U.S. security interests in
the short- and mid-range periods.
IPSP (Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning)
:
Contains a comprehensive statement of substantial
military intelligence priorities to support the
assignment of tasks to DOD intelligence production,
collection, and support activities in the short- and
mid-range periods.
- JSCP (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) : Contains the
military strategy to support the national security
objectives and the derived military objectives. Gives
guidance, based on projected military capabilities and
conditions during the short-range period, and task
assignments to the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services for
accomplishment of military tasks. Apportions forces
and lift assets available for planning. [Ref. 20:pp.
321-322]
The JSPS and the PPBS are interconnected systems which,
together, provide the CINCs with the optimum mix of
missions, forces, equipment, and support attainable within
given fiscal constraints. The cycle created by these two
systems lasts six years with a new cycle beginning every
other year. [Ref. 20:p. 103]
4. Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)
JOPS is the system used by the DOD to conduct joint
planning during peacetime and in crisis. JOPS enables the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give strategic
direction to the Armed Forces and also established
procedures for the development, review, and execution of
global and regional plans. The intent of JOPS is to enable
its users to solve the "complex strategic mobility problem
associated with force and support deployment and
sustainment. " [Ref. 20;p. 121]
The development of JOPS began in the 1960 's in an
attempt to unite the disparate computers, software programs,
planning procedures, and documentation that had been
developed by each service and command. Today, JOPS
directive documentation is organized in the following
volumes:
- JOPS Volume I (JCS Pub 5-02.1) "Deliberate Planning
Procedures": Contains guidance and administrative
procedures for developing, coordinating, disseminating,
reviewing, and approving joint operation plans during
peacetime.
- JOPS Volume II (JCS Pub 5-02.2) "Supplementary Planning
Guidance": Gives directions, procedures, and planning
guidance keyed to certain plan annexes, as well as
formats for classified subjects.
- JOPS Volume III (JCS Pub 5-02.3) "ADP Support":
Describes the V7WMCCS system that supports the plan
development phase of deliberate planning.
- JOPS Volume IV (JCS Pub 5-02.4) "Crisis Action
Procedures": Outlines guidance and procedures for
joint planning during emergency or time-sensitive
situations. The procedures give guidance to the JCS,
Services, CINCs, and defense agencies for developing
timely recommendations to the NCA. [Ref. 20:pp. 121-
122]
JOPS is closely entwined with the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System as well as the Joint Strategic Planning
System. The points of intersection between the three
systems are depicted in Figure 7. [Ref. 20:p. 124]
5. Joint Deployment System (JDS)
Crisis action planning places many demands upon its







planner must analyze the situation, develop courses of
action (COAs) , assess the adequacy of those courses of
action, create the detailed plan, test the feasibility of
the plan, and translate the plan into an operational order.
JDS was developed to assist the crisis action planner in his
duties. JDS is a "real-time, transaction-oriented,
distributed database system" that manages the flow of
deployment data. It is an integral part of the WWMCCS and
interfaces with other C^ systems. JDS fulfills not only
deliberate planning functions, it serves to bridge the gap
between deliberate planning and the formulation of crisis
action procedures (CAPs) . Through JDS, crisis action
planners are able to:
Simultaneously build, maintain, and manage exercise and
real— world deployment plans;
Establish operational plans or courses of action from
JOPS-- created deployment plans or force modules;
Create a JOPS-formatted deployment plan from the JDS
dat.abase
;
Add, change, or delete information by using computer
terminals or automated system interfaces;
Schedule or monitor deployments;
Offer close-hold capabilities to develop operational
plans
;
Automatically alert units and installations of
scheduled deployments;
- Monitor ongoing system performance;
Integrate force module capabilities; and
Improve the timeliness and accuracy of deployment
information.
JDS is refined, administered, and operated by the U.S.
Transportation Command. A schematic representation of the
relationship between JDS and JOPS may be seen in Figure 8.
[Ref. 20:pp. 238-241]
6. Joint Operation Planning said Execution System
(JOPES)
Despite the positive aspects of the Joint Operation
Planning System and the Joint Deployment System, the fact
remains that two separate systems exist to accomplish war
planning and execution. Two new systems were introduced to
correct interface problems between JOPS and JDS. One of
these programs is the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) which
has already been described. The second program is the Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System or JOPES. [Ref.
20:p. 251]
JOPES will replace JOPS and JDS. It will be an
integrated C^ system designed to satisfy the information
needs of senior-level decision makers in conducting joint
planning and operations. JOPES will monitor, plan, and
execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and
sustainment activities for national, theater, and supporting
echelons in time of peace and war. JOPES will not have the
ability to execute actions on its own but, rather, will
serve as a means of providing decision makers with the
ability to monitor, analyze, and control events during







Threat identification and assessment;
Strategy determination;




A diagram of these functions is shown in Figure 9. [Ref.
20: p. 2 54] The development of JOPES will be evolutionary,
each increase in capability to be accompanied by a
supporting block of ADP development by WIS. JOPES will
provide the identification and analysis of force
requirements and capabilities to both JSPS and PPBS . [Ref.
20:pp. 251-256]
G. SUMMARY
Now that the major components of the Department of
Defense and the National Command Structure have been
presented and explored, specific command and control
structures will now be presented and analyzed. The largest
and most complex of these structures is that which is found












































V. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
Nowhere are C^ requirements more demanding than they
are in the realm of strategic nuclear command and control.
The purpose of the strategic nuclear C^ system sounds simple
enough — the detection of incoming attacks, the ability to
provide direction to the Armed Forces, and the ability to
carry out battle management during prolonged confrontations.
Each of these tasks, however, involves requirements that are
seemingly impossible to satisfy. Sea launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) firings from off the coast of the United
States can reach Washington, D.C. within minutes. The
detection of incoming attacks must therefore be made swiftly
and accurately. Also, provisions must be made so that some
sort of command structure remains intact to provide the NCA
with the means to direct their forces. This task implies
survivability— an extremely costly and difficult attribute
to guarantee. Lastly, for battle management to be
sustained, the strategic nuclear command structure must be
such that it is easily and quickly reconstituted. In the
ravaged environment left by nuclear exchange, this task may
be the most difficult to accomplish.
Today it is generally acknowledged that a homeland to
homeland exchange of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union
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is an improbable scenario and therefore, the strategic
nuclear C^ system may seem superfluous. This C^ structure
is better understood if viewed as having both peacetime and
wartime functions. Its function during war is obvious. Its
function during peacetime is more subtle. The existence of
a quick, accurate, survivable, and reconstitutable strategic
nuclear command and control system adds great credibility to
the nation's current strategic nuclear policy of "deterrence
through guaranteed reprisal." [Ref. 38:p. 113] A
simplified depiction of the U.S. strategic command and
control structure may be seen in Figure 10. [Ref. 41 :p. 2]
B. EVOLUTION OF U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY
Since the advent of nuclear weapons our nation's
strategic policy has been shaped by presidential
administrations, the warmth or coolness of U.S. /USSR
relations, and the status of relations with other nuclear
capable nations. Study of the changing strategic policies
tells an interesting story of the role that nuclear weapons
play with our nation's military.
1. Mutual Deterrence or Massive Retaliation
This strategic policy was born during the
Eisenhower Administration. The world retained quite a bit
of naivete about this new weapon. This form of strategic
policy was based on the following logic:
Because it is usually assumed that neither side can
disarm the opponent, choosing to attack risks nuclear
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U.S. Strategic Coiojnand and Control Structure
sides are deterred. Nuclear stalemate exists despite
the possibility that an aggressor might expect to
destroy a large part of the opponent's forces and
substantially weaken his resolve. Unless the
probability of retaliation is vanishingly small, the
expected costs of a first strike will always outweigh
the benefits. [Ref. 42:p. 16]
Later the issue of survivability was taken into account.
Victory, as defined by the policy of mutual deterrence,
could be achieved only with obliteration of all the enemy's
nuclear capabilities. By the early 1960 's, the Kennedy and
then the Johnson Administrations determined that "assurance
of obliteration could no longer be provided" and that "under
the technological conditions of the times, there were
reasons to believe it would remain out of reach forever."
[Ref. 42:p. 18]
2. Mutually Assured Destruction
Under this policy one finds a quantification of the
desirable amount of destruction to be achieved with nuclear
retaliation after a Soviet first strike. This policy called
for U.S. strategic nuclear forces to be able to destroy 20
to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of the
Soviet industrial complex. [Ref. 42:p. 21]
The late 1960 's saw the beginning of the shift away
from thoughts of homeland-to-homeland nuclear exchange with
the Soviet Union. The formulation began of a new policy
that would allow the nation to assume a "flexible posture
based on the forces, the plans, and the control arrangements
to execute, as necessary, a sequence of two distinct types
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of nuclear operations." The emphasis of this new policy
would be on central Europe should the "direct defense of
NATO territory with conventional forces fail to repel enemy
invaders." The two types of nuclear war now being planned
for were escalation to local use of nuclear weapons and, if
necessary, resorting to general nuclear war. [Ref. 42: p.
22]
3. Flexible Response
There is speculation that the unpopularity of the
Vietnam War forced the Nixon as well as the Ford
Administrations to shy away from stances that might be
perceived to be excessively pro-military. VThatever the
reason, the fact remains that the years of the Nixon and
Ford Administrations saw "the most substantial reduction in
American military capabilities relative to those of the
Soviet Union in the entire postwar period." During this
period command and control systems became severely
neglected. [Ref. 43:p. 320]
Also during this period came the discovery of a
paradox concerning the two previous strategic policies.
This paradox was that "if strategic deterrence based on the
threat of unrestrained retaliation fails, then it would not
be rational actually to carry out the threat." Flexible
Response made its appearance in the mid 1970 's at the end of
the Nixon Administration and was upheld throughout that of
President Ford. Under this new policy a failure of
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deterrence did not automatically lead to general nuclear
war. It was an important policy in that it extended
deterrence into the war itself and provided "distinguishable
firebreaks" between levels of intercontinental nuclear
warfare. [Ref. 42:p. 23, Ref. 43:pp. 352-353]
4. Countervailing Strategy and Survivability
This policy was developed during the Carter
Administration and was further refined by the Reagan
Administration. In the late 1970 's the need for
survivability was recognized in earnest. Countervailing
Strategy reflects this stating that the United States must
be able to "absorb the enemy's maximum attack and still be
able to destroy a specified percentage of Soviet economic,
political, and military resources." Under the Reagan
Administration, the policy was modified to reflect budgetary
constraints as well as operational needs. Emphasis was
placed on "controlled attacks" on specified targets to
include enemy missiles in hardened silos. [Ref. 42 :p. 26]
The emphasis on survivability shed new light on the
issue of command and control. Countervailing Strategy
called for the nation's C^ assets to be able to provide the
following:
Connectivity between the National Command Authorities
and strategic and other appropriate forces to support
flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and
after an enemy nuclear attack; and
Responsive support for operational control of the Armed
Forces, even during protracted nuclear conflict. [Ref.
44:p. 1]
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Survivability in terms of command and control had come to
demand the early detection of incoming attacks and the
ability to ride out the first attack and restore command and
control of surviving strategic nuclear forces in the
aftermath. In short, C^ must provide the means to detect,
assess, and react.
Before beginning a detailed discussion of the
detection, assessment, and reaction mechanisms one must
first have some knowledge of the Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP) and the North American Aerospace
Defense (NORAD) Command.
C. SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (SIOP)
U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities are described in
terms of the Strategic Triad, each leg of the Triad being
composed of a different weapon system. These systems are
sea launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and long-range manned bombers. [Ref. 33 :p. 59]
The concept of the Triad was briefly discussed in Chapter
III. In order to unify the control of these forces under
one plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan was
developed.
The most recent version of the SIOP is SIOP-6 which
came into effect on 1 October 1983. Input to the SIOP is
given by the NCA, NSC, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) , and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) but
the actual construction of the SIOP comes under the
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cognizance of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
(JSTPS) located at SAC headquarters, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.
[Ref. 45]
The SIOP is, understandably, a highly classified plan.
However, unclassified guidance on its basic structure is
available. The SIOP has undergone frequent yet subtle
changes since its beginning. SIOP-6 reportedly states
"extremely comprehensive" U.S. target plans for strategic
nuclear war. The SIOP specifies four principal target
groups
:
- Soviet nuclear forces;
Soviet general purpose forces;
Soviet military and political leadership centers; and
Soviet economic and industrial bases.
The SIOP is further divided into four "general categories of
options available for the employment of nuclear weapons."
These are:
Major Attack Options (MAOs)
;
Selective Attack Options (SAOs)
;
Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) ; and
Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs)
.
LNOs are designed so as to permit "the selective destruction
of fixed enemy military or industrial targets." RNOs are
intended to "destroy the leading elements of an attacking
force." [Ref. 45]
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D. THE NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE (NORAD) COMMAND
NORAD is located behind 25-ton blast doors deep within
Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain. The command is housed in 15
steel buildings mounted on spring shock absorbers and
stocked with a 3 day supply of food and water for its
personnel. The missions of NORAD are defined by agreements
between the United States and Canada. Specifically, NORAD
is responsible for "surveillance and control of North
American airspace, for providing warning and assessment of
attack, and for defending the continent against attack."
NORAD is responsible for the initial coordination of the
detection, assessment, and reaction mechanisms that make up
the Strategic Command and Control System. Of these
functions, NORAD 's mission of warning and assessment is
considered to be the most critical. The mission of attack
warning entails the determination that an air attack on the
North American continent is taking place. The mission of
attack assessment involves the identification of the types
of threats involved, the threat origin, and probable
targets. The Commander in Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) is
responsible for making such assessments. To do so he draws
on several resources:
A general base of information about Soviet weapon
capabilities and locations;
Inputs from U.S. intelligence agencies about the
current strategic situation; and
Data from infrared, optical, and radar sensors located
around the world and in orbit.
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Once made, CINCNORAD's assessment is relayed to the NCA.
[Ref. 38:pp. 53-59]
E . DETECTION
The first mission of strategic command and control is
the detection of threats to the U.S. homeland. One type of
threat is that which is perceived by U.S. military planners
due to a deteriorating international picture. U.S. response
in such a case would no doubt involve stepped-up readiness
postures for the Armed Forces at the very least. Another
type of threat involves a surprise nuclear attack,
presumably by Soviet forces. It is for this surprise attack
that our warning sensors must be geared though the
possibility of such an attack is currently thought to be
small. The impressive Soviet nuclear arsenal and the close
range at which Soviet ballistic missile submarines patrol
the coast of the U.S. mandates that accurate and reliable
sensors be active at all times to minimize the level of
surprise
.
1. Missile Warning Systems
The consequences of faulty detection and assessment
of a Soviet attack may be catastrophic. To ensure that no
such mistakes are made, U.S. strategic nuclear policy
requires conformance with a policy called "dual
phenomenology." This is a formal Department of Defense
policy which requires "two independent means and systems to
detect and verify nuclear attacks. The second source would
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serve to verify warning information about the first." [Ref.
41 :p. 43] The concepts of dual phenomenology apply to all
nuclear launch policies of the United States.
a. Defense Support Program (DSP) Early Warning
Satellites
The DSP is the element of U.S. strategic
surveillance which is designed to provide the earliest
possible detection of ballistic missile launch. DSP began
development in the late 1960 's and became operational in
1973. The system today consists of three satellites in
geosynchronous orbits over South America, the central
Pacific and the Indian Ocean. DSP satellites are configured
so that they can detect SLBM launches from the Atlantic or
the Pacific and ICBM launches from the Soviet Union. DSP
satellites at their 22,000 mile orbital altitude are
considered to be fairly safe from Soviet antisatellite
(ASAT) weapons. Connectivity from DSP to the NCA is
dependent upon highly vulnerable ground communication lines
and overseas downlink facilities. Intelligence collected by
DSP is relayed to the NCA via NORAD. It should be noted
that while no specific replacement for the DSP is currently
under consideration, the next-generation detection system
could be born of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Research. [Ref. 37:p. 65]
b. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
has been in operation since 1962 and, since its beginnings,
has served as one of North America's primary alert
mechanisms against airborne attack. The original system has
undergone frequent upgrades and currently consists of three
radar sites at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and
Fylingdales Moor, England. These three sites provide
detection and tracking from the northern approaches. Data
is transmitted to NORAD headquarters at the Cheyenne
Mountain Complex (CMC) and SAC headquarters. [Ref. 41:pp.
107-108] The areas of BMEWS coverage may be seen in Figure
11. [Ref. 46:p. 312]
Future planned modifications for the BMEWS
include the installation of a two-faced 240-degree azimuth
radar at Thule, and a 260-degree three-sided radar at
Fylingdales Moor. These modifications will greatly augment
the ability of BMEWS to track an attack by multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) . [Ref.
41:p. 108]
c. Cobra Dane
The Cobra Dane system consists of an immense
phased-array radar located on the island of Shemya in the
Aleutian chain. The radar has been in operation since 1977
and was specifically designed for the tracking of ICBMs,
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Detection Sweeps
the BMEWS system and is capable of providing NORAD with
information on 200 target tracks. [Ref. 38;p. 59]
d. Pave Paws
The Pave Paws system consists of phased-array
radars located on the borders of the continental United
States which "detect, track, and provide early-warning and
attack characterization" of SLBMs. Warning and attack data
from the Pave Paws system is relayed to NORAD, SAC
headquarters, and the NCA via WWMCCS . There are four
operational Pave Paws sites. These are located at Beale
AFB, California; Otis Air National Guard Base, Cape Cod,
Massachusetts; Robins AFB, Georgia; and Goodfellow AFB,
Texas. [Ref. 46] The area of coverage of Pave Paws is
depicted in Figure 11. [Ref. 45 :p. 312] As a secondary
mission. Pave Paws provides track orbit data of space
objects for NORAD.
e. Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization
System (PARCS)
PARCS operates as a back-up to BMEWS for ICBM
attacks as well as offers limited coverage of SLBM attacks
from near-arctic areas. PARCS is located in Cavalier, North
Dakota and is composed of one single-sided phased-array
radar. [Ref. 38 :p. 104] Its capability for distant early
earning is far outdistanced by the long-range BMEWS and Pave
Paws systems. However, PARCS fulfills a vital function in
its role as an attack characterization sensor. It is able
to track hundreds of MIRVs and predict impact points to
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within several thousand feet. Data from PARCS is relayed to
NORAD and includes raid count, impact profile, and target
class summary which is defined as the number of weapons
expected to land on cities, missile fields, bomber or
tanker airfields, C^ centers, and Washington, D.C. [Ref.
42 :p. 224] The area of detection coverage of PARCS is
depicted in Figure 11. [Ref. 45:p. 312]
2. Air-Breathing Attack Warning Systems
The air-breathing threat consists of manned bomber
aircraft, air-to-surface missiles, and cruise missiles.
Recently this threat has received greater attention due to
the offensive potential of the Soviet Union's supersonic
Backfire and Blackjack penetrating bombers, both of which
can be loaded with nuclear-capable air-to-surface missiles.
After years of neglect due to preoccupation with ICBMs and
SLBMs, the air-breathing threat warning systems are being
thoroughly upgraded to provide a viable detection system.
[Ref. 38:pp. 99-100]
a. Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar
The mission of OTH-B is to provide long-range
detection and early warning of air-breathing threats to the
continental United States. OTH-B is capable of detecting
objects flying at very low altitudes. OTH-B works in the
high frequency (HF) band. Its signal is refracted off the
ionosphere and is capable of traveling well beyond the
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horizon to distances of approximately 1,800 nautical miles.
[Ref. 37:p. 81]
The OTH-B system currently consists of one
operational site located in Maine. Further sites (the East,
West, North-Central, and Alaskan OTH-B radars) are scheduled
to be operational in the early 1990 's. The total system
will provide long-range surveillance of all but the polar
air approaches. This gap in coverage is due to the adverse
affect of the aurora borealis on OTH-B technology. However,
OTH-B is used in conjunction with other systems to provide
complete coverage. [Ref. 37:p. 82]
b. North Warning System (NV7S)
NWS is the means by which full air coverage is
obtained of the northern air approaches. NWS is the stop-
gap system to OTH-B 's "hole" at the north pole. The primary
component of NWS is the North Warning Radar. The North
Warning Radar is the extensive update to the antiquated
Distant Early Warning (DEW) System, a line of radars strung
across the northern reaches of North America. The 31 DEW
radars are to be replaced with 52 newer and better radars.
Thirteen of the radars will be long-range, manned radar
systems. The remaining 39 will be "short-range, unattended
gap-filler type radars." The system is expected to be fully
operational by the early 1990 's. [Ref. 38:pp. 106-107]
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c. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
The detection systems discussed thus far
represent our nation's primary means of detection of
airborne and spaceborne threats. However, they are not
without their limitations. All systems are non-mobile and
must be considered to be vulnerable and non-survivable.
And, as stated earlier, DSP is dependent upon vulnerable
ground communications and overseas stations. The mission of
AWACS is to provide a survivable airborne surveillance post
for air defense early warning. AWACS has a secondary C^
mission of serving as a flying command, control, and
communication center for the direction of tactical aircraft.
[Ref. 38:p. 82]
AWACS has been operational since 1977. The
electronics and data processing suite is housed in a Boeing
707 commercial jet airframe. AWACS is capable of detecting
airborne targets from distances as great as 350 miles, over
both land and water, and at all altitudes. As a highly
survivable system, AWACS can be used in a strategic defense
role by "providing detection, identification, tracking and
warning functions, and by using its command and control
features to help intercept the attack." [Ref. 38 :p. 83]
F. ATTACK ASSESSMENT AND REACTION
SLBMs launched from Soviet Yankee-class submarines
patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea are
capable of reaching Washington, D.C. within five to seven
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minutes. Inland targets (SAC headquarters, missile fields,
etc.) would be within reach of these SLBMs in less than 15
minutes. Intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from
Soviet missile fields would reach their intended targets
between 2 5 to 3 minutes after launch. Clearly, rapid
detection of an incoming air attack is necessary to allow
any time at all for attack assessment and reaction. An
attack by SLBMs probably will not allow for safe relocation
of the NCA. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) is
the operational nerve center for the command and control of
U.S. military forces on a day-to-day basis. Located within
the Pentagon, the NMCC will not survive a direct attack.
The Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) is a
hardened, underground facility located near Fort Ritchie,
Maryland and it, too, will not survive a direct attack.
Even NORAD is incapable of surviving direct hits by the
Soviet Union's highly accurate SS-18 ICBMs. While the
Soviets build deep underground command facilities in which
to ride out nuclear attacks, the United States operates on
the principle that "anything that can be found can be
destroyed." [Ref. 47 :p. 125] The survival of command and
control, therefore, has been placed in the hands of highly
mobile command posts.
1. National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)
There are three command centers of the National
Military Command System (NMCS) which directly support the
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NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The primary and
alternate command centers have already been mentioned. The
third command center is the National Emergency Airborne
Command Post or NEACP. NEACP was designed to be a
survivable command and control platform to enable the NCA to
direct retaliatory forces during and following an attack
against the United States. The survivability of NEACP
increases the probability that the NCA will exist to be able
to direct the execution of the SIOP and wage nuclear war
against the attacker. [Ref. 38:p. 113]
The NEACP platform is the E-4B aircraft, a
derivative of the commercial Boeing 747 jet. The NEACP
system is comprised of four fully operational aircraft.
NEACP is managed by the Strategic Air Command and the
aircraft are based at Grissom AFB, Indiana. Each aircraft
carries a communication suite which is capable of linking
with military assets ranging from submarines to satellites.
Further, NEACP is considered to be the key component of the
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network or MEECN.
This network makes up the core of the WV7MCCS system and
consists of an assortment of strategic command and control
systems which are intended to provide survivable
connectivity between the NCA and U.S. Armed Forces around
the globe. [Ref. 38:pp. 113-116]
2. Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS)
PACCS, like NEACP, belongs to the Strategic Air
Command. The mission of this system is to serve as an
airborne strategic command and control network to be used to
control SAC bombers and ICBM forces in the "event that its
underground command centers, alternate command posts, or
ground-based communications are destroyed." Whereas NEACP
is the survivable backup to be used by the NCA to direct the
full range of U.S. strategic forces, PACCS possesses the
more specific mission of providing C^ for SAC's nuclear
assets. [Ref. 38 :p. 117] The air platform for PACCS is the
EC-135 aircraft and the entire system is composed of several
components
:
SAC Airborne Command Post (code name "Looking Glass");
East Auxiliary Command Post
;
West Auxiliary Command Post;
- Three Airborne Launch Control Centers; and
Two Radio Relay Aircraft. [Ref. 38 :p. 117]
a. Looking Glass
The mission of Looking Glass is to provide
survivable connectivity between the NCA and the SIOP
forces. In order to preclude command and control
decapitation from a surprise Soviet first strike, a Looking
Glass aircraft has been on continual 24-hour airborne alert
status since 1961. The Looking Glass aircraft are based at
Offutt AFB, Nebraska. [Ref. 38:p. 118]
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b. East and West Auxiliary Command Post
These aircraft are back-ups to the Looking
Glass aircraft and are utilized in the event of
incapacitation of Looking Glass or when otherwise directed
by the NCA. The East Auxiliary Command Post is colocated
with Looking Glass at Offutt AFB. The West Auxiliary
Command Post is located at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota.
[Ref. 46:p. 178]
c. Airborne Launch Control Centers
The mission of these aircraft are to
provide a capability for ICBM launch in the event that the
underground launch control centers become incapacitated.
These three aircraft are based at Ellsworth AFB, South
Dakota. [Ref. 46:p. 178]
d. Radio Relay Aircraft
These two aircraft are stationed at Grissom
AFB, Indiana. Their mission is to provide an alternative
means of maintaining strategic connectivity between NEACP
and all PACCS aircraft. [Ref. 46:p. 179]
e. ICBM Launch Mechanisms
The battlestaffs aboard Looking Glass, the
East and West Auxiliary Command Posts, and the three
Airborne Launch Control Centers all possess the capability
to launch Minuteman missiles. The order to launch the ICBMs
can be given only after receipt of authorization from the
NCA via authenticated Emergency Action Messages (EAMs)
.
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EAMs are the means by which nuclear launch orders are
dispersed to any nuclear capable platform. The EAMs are
pre-formatted and encoded and originate only with the
National Command Authorities. EAMs and their supporting
documentation (decoding documents, procedures, etc.) are
highly sensitive. Two-man control is required for the
decoding of the EAMs as well as for the launch of any
missile.
The key component of the airborne launch
control system is the Looking Glass aircraft. The Looking
Glass aircraft possesses four primary means of ensuring
missile launch following the receipt of an authenticated
EAM. First, Looking Glass may transmit the EAMs to the
underground launch facilities itself. Secondly, Looking
Glass may direct the Airborne Launch Control Centers to
launch their assigned missiles. Third, in case of a
communication failure, Looking Glass can fire the Minuteman
missiles on its own by transmitting coded Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) signals to a receiving antenna installed
next to each silo. Finally, Looking Glass may cause the
launch of the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS)
.
[Ref. 47: pp. 149-150] ERCS consists of a group of Minuteman
missiles located at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. These missiles
carry a UHF communication package in place of warheads.
ERCS missiles are launched into suborbital trajectories of
approximately 30 minutes duration during which time these
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missiles continually transmit recorded launch orders. [Ref.
38; pp. 117-118] All PACCS aircraft are components of MEECN.
[Ref. 38:p. 118]
3. Worldwide Airborne CoiniDand Post (WWABNCP)
A variation of the EC-135 aircraft is the Worldwide
Airborne Command Post or WWABNCP. WWABNCP is used by the
nuclear force commanders: the Commanders in Chief of the
Atlantic, Pacific, and European Commands. The aircraft has
a mission of providing strategic command and control
platforms for these commands as well as serving as a
platform for tactical command and control missions. The
WWABNCP aircraft is a component of MEECN. [Ref. 38 :p. 118]
4
.
TACAMO Strategic Submarine Communication System
The mission of TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out) is
to serve as the strategic airborne radio relay between the
NCA and deployed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
.
TACAMO aircraft are kept on continuous 24-hour patrol over
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to increase the probability
that EAMs will be received by the submarines during and
following a strategic attack against the United States.
[Ref. 38:p. 89]
EC-130S currently make-up the TACAMO fleet. The
U.S. Navy is replacing this fleet with the E-6A aircraft, a
derivative of the Boeing E-3A (707) airframe. The complete
transition to the E-6A is expected to occur in the 1990 's.
TACAMO uses Very Low Frequency (VLF) signals to communicate
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with the SSBNs. TACAMO is also one of the surviving
elements of MEECN. [Ref. 37:pp. 73-75]
The TACAMO system is considered to be extremely
survivable and reliable. No systems are expected to replace
TACAMO for many years. However, a few new systems have been
identified which may improve the connectivity to and from
the TACAMO system. Systems of this nature which are likely
to generate future interest are the Extremely Low Frequency
(ELF) Submarine Communication System [Ref. 38:p. 86], an
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) satellite system (Milstar)
[Ref. 37 :p. 75], and a possible blue-green laser satellite
communication system. [Ref. 37:p. 144]
G. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
Strategic communications and the survivability of
strategic communications is perhaps the most important
aspect of strategic nuclear command and control. Failure of
strategic communications might mean that warning data is not
received by NORAD, or that attack assessments are not
received by the NCA, or that EAMs are not received by the
strategic nuclear forces.
The complete make-up of the strategic communication
system is complex and immense and well beyond the scope of
this thesis. However, students of command and control
should have some knowledge of a few of the larger components
of the system.
1. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
The backbone of DOD communications is the Defense
Satellite Communications System or DSCS. The latest
generation of this system is DSCS III. The complete program
calls for four operational satellites in synchronous orbit
and two on-orbit spares. The satellites provide "high-
capacity, long-haul superhigh frequency (SHF) (7 to 8 GHz)
satellite communications for all U.S. services and some
allies." [Ref. 37:pp. 63-64]
2. Military Strategic/Tactical and Relay System
(Milstar)
A follow-on system to DSCS is already designed— the
Military Strategic/Tactical and Relay System or Milstar.
This satellite system will be used "to control both
strategic and tactical forces and to relay intelligence
information from satellites and other sources." [Ref. 37 :p.
61]
Due to the inherent vulnerability of satellites to
ASAT weapons and electronic countermeasures, Milstar has
been designed from the beginning to be able to continue
fulfillment of its functions even in the environment of all-
out war. Milstar will be able to provide communication
support for AWACS, NEACP, Pave Paws, TACAMO, SSBNs, SAC
bombers, and many more subscribers. Milstar is expected to
reach initial operational capability in the early 1990 's.
[Ref. 37: pp. 61-62]
3. Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)
A primary concern of command and control is the
survivability of our strategic communications. The current
primary means for strategic communications is the DSCS III
and, eventually, Milstar. However, the nation's only
satellite launch facilities— Cape Kennedy, Florida and
Vandenburg AFB, California— are located on the coasts and
are vulnerable to airborne attack. Further, Soviet
antisatellite (ASAT) technology places at risk our overhead
platforms. The need for an alternate means of strategic
communications was recognized and gave rise to the Ground
Wave Emergency Network or GWEN.
GWEN is a "ground-based strategic communication
system consisting of a large number of EMP-hardened low
frequency unmanned radio relay stations deployed across the
continental United States." GWEN ' s mission is to provide a
survivable long-range strategic C^ system which links the
NCA with strategic command centers and SIOP forces. GWEN is
a highly redundant system that utilizes packet switching
techniques which permit rapid reconstitution of connectivity
despite heavy damage. The entire GWEN system may involve
nearly 4 00 relay nodes and is expected to be ready for
operations by 1990. Once operational, GWEN will be a vital
component of MEECN. [Ref. 38 :p. 85]
students interested in a more in-depth analysis and
description of U.S. strategic nuclear command and control
should refer to Reference 48.
H. SUMMARY
Strategic nuclear command and control is critical for
the reason that its failure might mean undetected and,
possibly, unanswered nuclear strikes against the United
States. Today, with the general perception that the chances
of homeland to homeland nuclear exchange are remote, the
study of command and control with regard to tactical warfare
doctrine takes on added importance and will be discussed in
Chapter VI.
VI. SERVICE DOCTRINE AND TACTICAL C^
A. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental understanding of the warfighting
doctrines of each of the Armed Forces will significantly
enhance future endeavors to unite the services in joint
operations. Because the area of command and control crosses
all service boundaries and ensures the opportunity for
successful joint operations, it is the biggest problem
facing the DOD in its attempt to obtain complete
interoperability. This chapter provides an introduction to
the warfighting doctrines of services, and presents an
example of the tactical warfare command and control
structure of each service including: Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. To reach our ultimate goal
of true "jointness" among the services, military leaders
must have a basic understanding of each service's
warfighting doctrine.
B. DOCTRINE
As always, terminology is our foremost problem in
discussing service doctrine. "A common word may have
different meanings to each service." [Ref. 49 :p. 29] This
is even more prevalent among our allies. It is important
not to "interject your service perspective into the reading
of other service's doctrine." [Ref. 49:p. 29] Let us again
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refer to JCS Pub 1 for standardized definitions of DOD
terminology.
Doctrine— Fundamental principles by which the military
forces or elements thereof guide their actions in
support of national objectives. It is authoritative
but requires judgement in application. [Ref. 7:p. 118]
In essence, doctrine represents our beliefs in how we
should employ our military forces. There are three types of
doctrines: service, joint, and combined. The only
distinction between each type is the actual participants who
support the specified doctrine.
Service doctrine is binding only upon that service,
while joint and combined doctrines are binding upon all
the services that agreed to it. Joint doctrine is
doctrine between two or more services, while combined
doctrine is between two or more nations. [Ref. 49: p.
30]
Although it is recommended, service doctrines do not have to
be aligned with joint or combined doctrines. However, it is
expected that "when a service employs forces in a joint or
combined operation, it must be in line with the accepted
joint and combined doctrines." [Ref. 49 :p. 30] General
Curtis E. Lemay, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
described doctrine in this way:
At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It
represents the central beliefs for waging war in order
to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network
of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which
lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment,
and tactics. It is the building material for strategy.
It is fundamental to sound judgement. [Ref. 50:p. i]
C. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
The principles of war play a significant role in the
doctrines of the military forces of many countries. The
principles vary from country to country dependent on the
each country's history and experiences. "The principles of
war represent generally accepted major truths which have
proved successful in the art and science of conducting war."
[Ref. 3:p. 2-4] The Army and Air Force warfighting
doctrines are born out of the principles of war. The
doctrines provide "naturally accepted and officially
sanctioned guidelines to the application of these principles
in warfare." [Ref. 3:p. 2-5]
The order of importance among the principles will vary
based on the conflict or situation in which they are applied
[Ref. 3:p. 2-5]. The nine principles of war described here
are taken from Army Field Manual 100-1, which "expresses
the fundamental roles, principles, and precepts" of the U.
S. Army. Although the descriptions vary slightly from those
in the Air Force doctrinal manual, AFM 1-1, the principles
are essentially the same.
OBJECTIVE— Every military operation should be directed
towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable
objective. The ultimate military objective of war is
the defeat of the enemy's Armed Forces.
Correspondingly, each operation must contribute to the
ultimate objective. Intermediate objectives must
directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the
purpose of the ultimate objective. The selection of
objectives is based on consideration of the mission,
the means and time available, the enemy, and the
operational area. Every commander must understand and
clearly define his objective and consider each
contemplated action in light thereof.
OFFENSIVE— Offensive action is necessary to achieve
decisive results and to maintain freedom of action. It
permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose
his will on the enemy, to set the terms and select the
place of battle, to exploit enemy weaknesses and
rapidly changing situations, and to react to unexpected
developments. The defensive may be forced on the
commander as a temporary expedient while awaiting an
opportunity for offensive action or may be adopted
deliberately for the purpose of economizing forces on a
front where a decision is not sought. Even on the
defensive, the commander seeks opportunities to seize
the initiative and achieve decisive results by
offensive action.
MASS— Superior combat power must be concentrated at
the critical time and place for decisive results.
Superiority results from the proper combination of the
elements of combat power. Proper application of this
principle, in conjunction with other principles of war,
may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve
decisive combat superiority at the point of decision.
ECONOMY OF FORCE— This principle is the reciprocal of
the principle of mass. Minimum essential means must be
employed at points other than that of the main effort.
Economy of force requires the acceptance of prudent
risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the
point of decision. Economy of force missions may
require limited attack, defense, cover and deception,
or retrograde action.
MANUEVER— Maneuver is an essential ingredient of
combat power. It contributes materially in exploiting
success and in preserving freedom of action and
reducing vulnerability. The object of maneuver is to
concentrate (or disperse) forces in a manner to place
the enemy in a position of disadvantage and thus
achieve results that would otherwise be costly in men
and materiel.
UNITY OF COMMAND— The decisive application of full
combat power requires unity of command. Unity of
command results in unity of effort by coordinating the
action of all forces towards a common goal. While
coordination may be achieved by cooperation, it is best
achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite
authority.
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SECURITY— Security is essential to the preservation of
combat power. Security results from the measures taken
by a command to protect itself from espionage,
observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. It is a
condition that results from the establishment and
maintenance of protective measures against hostile acts
or influences. Since risk is inherent in war,
application of the principle of security does not imply
undue caution and avoidance of calculated risk.
SURPRISE— Surprise can decisively shift the balance of
combat power. With surprise, success out of proportion
to effort expended may be obtained. Surprise results
from striking an enemy at a time and/or place and in a
manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential
that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he
become aware too late to react effectively. Factors
contributing to surprise include speed, cover and
deception, application of unexpected combat power,
effective intelligence, variations of tactics and
methods of operation, and operations security (OPSEC)
.
OPSEC consists of signals and electronic security,
physical security, and counterintelligence to deny
enemy forces knowledge or forewarning of intent.
SIMPLICITY— Simplicity contributes to successful
operations. Direct, simple plans and clear, concise
orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion. Other
factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferred.
[Ref. 51:pp. 14-16]
In addition to these nine principles, the Air Force includes
three other principles.
TIMING AND TEMPO— Timing and tempo is the principle of
executing military operations at a point in time and at
a rate which optimizes the use of friendly forces and
which inhibits or denies the effectiveness of enemy
forces.
LOGISTICS— Logistics is the principle of sustaining
both man and machine in combat by obtaining, moving,
and maintaining warfighting potential. Success in
warfare depends on getting sufficient men and machines
in the right position at the right time.
COHESION— Cohesion is the principle of establishing
and maintaining the warfighting spirit and capability
of a force to win. Cohesion is the cement that holds a
unit together through the trials of combat and is
critical to the fighting effectiveness of a force.
[Ref. 50:pp. 2-8,2-9]
The Navy and Marine Corps do not officially recognize
the principles of war as the basis for their warfighting
doctrine, nor do they publish broad doctrinal documents
similar to the Air Force and Army. A variety of Naval
Warfare Publications (NWPs) address the warfighting
doctrines for the various combat sea operations. One of the
problems "with the principles of war is that they fail to
distinguish between land and sea combat." [Ref. 52 :p. 14 3]
Retired Navy Captain Wayne P. Hughes' work, Fleet Tactics .
provides five "propositions" upon which naval tactics are
built [Ref. 52:p. 145]. They are the principles of war for
combat at sea.
Naval warfare centers on the process of attrition.
Attrition comes from the successful delivery of
firepower.
Scouting-- locating the enemy sufficiently to deliver
effective firepower— is a crucial and integral process
of tactics.
C^ is the process that transforms scouting and
firepower potential into the reality of delivered
force.
Naval combat is a force-on-force process tending, in
the threat or realization, toward the simultaneous
attrition of both sides. To achieve victory one must
attack effectively first. Therefore actions taken to
interfere with the enemy's firepower, scouting, and C^
processes are also of fundamental importance.
Maneuver is also a tactical process. In fact, maneuver
in battle was once the classic definition of tactics.
Maneuver is the activity by which C^ positions forces
to scout and shoot. [Ref. 52:pp. 145-146]
Although one of the Marine Corps' primary missions is to
conduct operations that "may be essential to the prosecution
of a naval campaign" [Ref. 24:p. 2-7], they are capable of a
variety of operations not necessarily related to naval
campaigns [Ref. 49:p. 36]. This is evidenced by the recent
replacement of the term "amphibious" with "expeditionary"
when referring to their fighting forces. The Marine Corps'
warfighting doctrine is more closely aligned to the
principles of war used by the Army.
D. U. S. AIR FORCE
1. Tactical Doctrine
The U. S. Air Force's tactical air forces (TAFs)
have six tactical combat missions. As described in AFM 1-1,
these missions include: counter air; air interdiction; close
air support; tactical airlift; tactical air reconnaissance;
and special operations. The primary objective of the
counter air mission is to gain "air supremacy." Air
superiority must be established in order to "protect
friendly forces," to guarantee the free use of the airspace
environment for our purposes, and to "deny the use of that
environment to an enemy." [Ref. 50:p. 3-3] The Air Force
uses three types of counter air operations to accomplish
this: offensive counter air (OCA) ; defensive counter air
(DCA) ; and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) . [Ref.
50:p. 3-3]
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"Air interdiction objectives are to delay, disrupt,
divert, or destroy an enemy's military potential before it
can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces."
[Ref. 50: p. 3-3] Air interdiction strikes are conducted
against enemy ground forces, command and control
communication networks, and supply routes. They can be deep
behind enemy lines or relatively close to friendly
positions. [Ref. 50:pp. 3-3,3-4] Close air support mission
"objectives are to support surface operations by attacking
hostile targets in close proximity to friendly surface
forces." [Ref. 50:p. 3-4]
The objectives of airlifts "are to deploy, employ,
and sustain military forces" through air transport of
"personnel, equipment, and supplies." Tactical airlifts
pertain to operations performed within a theater of
operations in support of theater objectives. [Ref. 50 :p. 3-
5]
Tactical air reconnaissance missions "provide timely
notification of hostile intent...." They also provide
information to combat commanders regarding "the composition
and capability of enemy and potentially hostile forces."
[Ref. 50:p. 3-5]
Special operations mission objectives "are to
influence the accomplishment of .. .tactical objectives
normally through the conduct of low visibility, covert, or
clandestine military actions. [Ref. 50:p. 3-4] Command and
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control of the assets which conduct these missions is
critical to their success.
2 . Tactical Command and Control
The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) is the
primary C^ system currently used to employ TAFs. TACS is
defined by JCS Pub 1 as "the organization and equipment
necessary to plan, direct, and control tactical air
operations and to coordinate air operations with other
services. It is composed of control agencies and
communication-electronic facilities which provide a means
for centralized control and decentralized execution of
missions." [Ref. 7:p. 356] Figure 12 represents what is
referred to as the "classical TACS" structure. Actually,
"there is no set 'classical TACS' structure because a
commander can modify" the structure "to meet tactical
needs." [Ref. 54:p. 30]
The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) assists the
"tactical air force commander" in exercising "centralized
control of resources available to him." [Ref. 54:p. 32]
Air tasking orders, which specify tasking for assigned
units, are published by the TACC and distributed to the
subordinate commands. [Ref. 54:p. 32]
The Wing Operations Center (WOC) directs its
resources to perform decentralized execution of assigned
missions. "The wing commander uses the WOC for managing and

















specifically, the generation of sorties by his wing." [Ref.
54:p. 35]
The surveillance and control elements of TAGS
consist of the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) , the
Control and Reporting Post (CRP) , and the Forward Air
Control Post (FACP) . [Ref. 53] The CRC:
Directs the air defense activities within its sector;
Provides threat warning to friendly aircraft;
Provides control or flight following data to both
offensive and defensive missions;
Relays mission changes to aircraft as directed from
the TACC;
Coordinates the control of missions with subordinate
TACS units; and
Identifies aircraft. [Ref. 54:p. 33]
The CRP is a subordinate command to the CRC and performs the
same functions as the CRC [Ref. 7:p. 88]. The FACP is "a
highly mobile tactical air control system radar facility
subordinate to the CRC/CRP used to extend the radar coverage
and control (aircraft) in the forward combat area." [Ref.
7:p. 151]
The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) is
responsible for "decentralized execution of close air
support for ground units in the ASOC, which reports directly
to the TACC." [Ref. 54 :p. 35] Tactical Air Control
Parties (TACPs) are subordinate to the ASOC and are
"designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the
control of aircraft." [Ref. 7:p. 356] The TACP forward air
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controllers (FACs) control tactical close air support
mission aircraft in support of ground forces [Ref.
54:p.35]. The TACPs are assigned to each Army corps,
division, brigade, and battalion [Ref. 54:p. 35].
The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
,
discussed in Chapter V, provides similar services as the
CRC, as well as, FACP functions. AWACS has various mission
capabilities, including air defense warning, aircraft
control, navigational assistance, and coordination of air
rescue missions." [Ref. 54:p. 34]
The Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
(ABCCC) can be used as an alternate ASOC or a "limited
TACC" for some operations. The ABCCC ' s communication suite
gives it the "capability to control and coordinate tactical
air operations in the forward battle areas that are beyond
normal communication coverage of ground TACS elements."
[Ref. 54:p. 34]
E. U. S. ARMY
1. Airland Battle Doctrine
The basic warfighting doctrine for the U.S. Army is
known as the Airland Battle.
It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the
dynamics of combat power, and the application of the
classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield
requirements. It is called Airland Battle in
recognition of the inherently three-dimensional nature
of modern warfare. [Ref. 55:p. 9]
Airland Battle doctrine is a joint doctrine in that the
success of ground forces in modern combat is heavily
dependent on tactical air forces. The tactical air forces
critical to the success of the Airland Battle are U.S. Air
Force assets, which must be interoperable with U.S. Army
ground forces. The object of the Airland Battle is to
"impose our will upon the enemy— to achieve our purposes."
[Ref. 55: p. 14] To achieve this, the Army must seize the
initiative by delivering decisive and powerful blows upon
the enemy in an aggressive and unrelentless manner. "These
operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and
disorienting. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him
from taking effective counteractions." [Ref. 55:p. 14]
Army Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) states that "success on
the battlefield will depend on the Army's ability to fight
in accordance with four basic tenets: initiative, agility,
depth, and synchronization." [Ref. 55:p. 15]
Initiative-- Initiative means setting or changing the
terms of battle by action. In attack, initiative
implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the
initial shock of attack. [Ref. 55:p. 15]
- Agility— Agility (the ability of friendly forces to
act faster than the enemy) is the first prerequisite
for seizing and holding the initiative. [Ref. 55:p.
16]
Depth— Depth is the extension of operations in space,
time, and resources. In tactical actions, commanders
fight the enemy throughout the depth of his
dispositions with fires and with attacks on his flanks,
rear, and support echelons. [Ref. 55 :p. 16]
Synchronization— Synchronization is the arrangement of
battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to
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produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive
point. [Ref. 55:p. 17]
2. Tactical Command and Control
The Army identifies five battlefield functional
areas that must be integrated by a superior command and
control system in order to accomplish its mission. These
functional areas are: maneuver control, fire support, air
defense control, combat service support control, and
intelligence/ electronic warfare control. [Ref. 14 :p. 110]
Figure 13 depicts these five functional areas with regard
to the Army Command and Control System (ACCS) . [Ref. 56:p.
86] The Army coordinates the tactical air support of the
other services through the Army air-ground system [Ref. 7:p.
36].
The largest tactical unit in the Army is the corps.
Army corps' are tailored to meet the tactical requirements
of their mission. "Corps may be assigned divisions of any
type required by the theater and the mission." [Ref. 55:p.
185] Within each division there are three basic tactical
command and control facilities: Tactical command post (TAC)
,
Main command post or Tactical Operations Center (TOC) , and
the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) . The TAC is the
forward most command post, usually eight to 25 km from the
forward line of troops, or FLOT. The TAC is responsible for
maneuvering forces in the near or forward battles areas.
The TOC fights the deep battle and plans future operations







Aray Cominand and Control System
50 km behind the FLOT. The RAOC provides for the
sustainment of the current battle and for future battles.
It is the logistics center for the division. It is
responsible for the security of the division rear. The RAOC
is usually located at least 50 km from the FLOT. The TOC is
the focal of the three command posts (CPs) . The division
commander will move between the CPs as necessary to control
his forces. [Ref. 53]
F. U. S. MARINE CORPS
1. Tactical Doctrine
a. Marine Air-Ground Task Force
The doctrine of the U. S. Marine Corps strongly
emphasizes that "Fleet Marine Forces will normally be
employed as integrated air-ground teams." [Ref. 57 :p. 1-2]
Fleet Marine Force Manual 0-1 (FMFM 0-1) "sets forth the
organization, doctrine, tactics, and techniques to be used
in the formation and deployment of Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces" (MAGTFs) [Ref. 57:p. i] . The MAGTF is a task
organized team which is established to accomplish a specific
mission. Each MAGTF consists of four basic elements: a
command element, a ground combat element, an aviation
combat element, and a combat service support element.
[Ref. 57: p. 1-2] MAGTFs are organized in three basic types
ranging from the small Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to
the large Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
.
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b. Marine Expeditionary Unit
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the
smallest of the three MAGTF types. The MEU is generally
organized around a battalion landing team, a composite
aviation squadron, and a MEU service support group. [Ref.
57 :p. 5-3] A MEU is continuously deployed to the
Mediterranean Sea and Western Pacific Ocean aboard three to
five Navy amphibious ships [Ref. 53]. The MEU is used to
meet "routine peacetime requirements for forward deployed
afloat forces... it provides an immediate reaction capability
in crisis situations...." [Ref. 57 :p. 5-2] Some of the
missions of the MEU include:
- Advance force for follow on larger MAGTF;
Limited duration amphibious operations;
Amphibious raids; and
Evacuation of civilian installations.
Because these operations are small and of short duration,
the MEU headquarters usually remains aboard ship and is
commanded by an 0-6, colonel [Ref. 57:p. 5-2].
c. Marine Expeditionary Brigade
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a
MAGTF with a "combined arms force from two to five times the
size and combat power of a MEU." [Ref. 57 ;p. 6-1] The
ground combat element (GCE) of a MEB may be composed of two
to five battalion landing teams formed into a regimental
landing team. The aviation combat element (ACE) is a Marine
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Aircraft Group, which contains both fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters. The ACE also includes antiair warfare and air
control capabilities. [Ref. 57 :p. 6-3] The combat service
support element (CSSE) is a BSSG, brigade service support
group, organized to provide the necessary combat service
support (CSS) for the GCE and ACE. [Ref. 57 :p. 6-4] The
MEB is "capable of conducting all types of amphibious
operations, and is normally committed to combat operations
of limited scope." [Ref. 57: p. 6-2] As the situation
permits, the MEB headquarters transition from ship-to-shore
where the MAGTF commander will establish his command post
ashore. The MEB is usually commanded by a brigadier
general. [Ref. 57:p. 6-1]
d. Marine Expeditionary Force
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is "the
largest of the MAGTFs, ranging in size from just over half
of the assets of a division/wing team to a force of one or
more divisions and aircraft wings." [Ref. 57 :p. 7-1] The
GCE is usually a Marine division comprised of infantry
regiments and battalion landing teams [Ref. 57:p. 7-4]. The
ACE is a Marine aircraft wing, which is comprised of
aviation assets capable of all types of tactical air
missions. The CSSE for a MEF "is a force service support
group tailored to provide CSS beyond the organic capability
of the air and ground elements." [Ref. 57 :p. 7-5] "The MEF
is capable of the full range of amphibious operations and
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sustained operations ashore in any combat environment."
[Ref. 57 :p. 7-3] The MEF is commanded by a major general,
or lieutenant general, and the headquarters will transition
from ship to shore as the tactical situation dictates [Ref.
57:p. 7-4].
2 . Tactical Command and Control
Command and control of the MAGTF becomes cbmplex as
the assault forces land and advance the forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA) . The commander landing force, CLF, is
collocated with the commander amphibious task force, CATF,
aboard an amphibious command ship. The command
relationships for the amphibious operations are depicted in
Figure 14 [Ref. 53]. The CATF is responsible for the ship-
to-shore movement of all landing forces, and he will
maintain control until the CLF has established adequate
command and control facilities ashore. The shift of command
and control from CATF afloat to CLF ashore is actually a
gradual transfer of the major control agencies in the
MAGTF. These major control agencies are discussed below.
The combat operations center (COC) is the key element
for control of ground combat forces. It acts as the
hub or focal point for tactical command and control in
every major tactical command post down to the battalion
level, including combat support units.
The fire support coordination center (FSCC) is the
senior ground commander's most valuable tool for
getting the best weapon assigned to the preplanned
targets and emergency requests for fire during the land
battle.
The fire direction center (FDC) is the primary control











Command Relationships During Amphibious Operations
The tactical air command center (TACC) and tactical air
direction center (TADC) are the major air command and
control agencies. . .responsible planning and employment
of air assets that belong to the landing force.
The tactical air operations center (TAOC) is the agency
responsible for airspace control and air defense.
- The antiair operations center (AAOC) assists TAOC in
the air defense role through control of the Hawk
missile sites.
The direct air support center (DASC) directs close air
support aircraft onto assigned targets.... [Ref. 53:p.
20]
During the initial stage of the landing, the CLF maintains
his command post afloat and "the assault commanders ... run
their command posts from jeeps, helicopters, or amphibious
landing craft." [Ref. 53 :p. 21] All the control agencies
listed earlier gradually become established ashore as the
battle moves inland. "The final stage of an amphibious
operation involves the establishment of the landing force
command post ashore (MAGTF HQ) along with all the other air,
ground, and logistic control agencies." [Ref. 53 :p. 23]
It should be emphasized that the MAGTF is designed
to perform specific operations. The objective of the
amphibious assault is to establish secure areas in order to
provide staging areas for Army units to initiate occupation
missions and offensive campaigns. Once the objectives are
met, the MAGTF will be dissolved and the Marine forces will
return to the amphibious task force vessels. [Ref. 53]
G. U. S. NAVY
1. Tactical Doctrine
The primary mission of the U. S. Navy is
accomplished through the performance of two fundamental
missions: sea control and power projection [Ref. 49:p. 34].
Sea control is the control of the sea lines of communication
(SLOC) , while power projection is the infliction of damage
to ashore targets through naval air strikes, cruise
missiles, and amphibious operations [Ref. 52 :p. 220]. To
match these missions to the forces available, the Navy uses
task forces. The task force concept provides "the assembly
of the right forces in the right numbers to carry out an
assigned task." [Ref. 52 :p. 218] The single fighting force
of today's Navy is the integrated naval battle force. The
Navy achieves sea control "by the engagement and destruction
of, or by deterrence through, the threat of destruction of
hostile aircraft, ships, and submarines at sea." [Ref.
49: p. 34] Power projection employs the same process as sea
control except for targets ashore. "Power projection would
be clearer if its definition included the safe movement of
shipping and the timely military reinforcement and resupply
of ground operations...." [Ref. 52:p. 220] The integrated
naval battle force accomplishes these missions through the
correlation of "mission-specific" forces [Ref. 52:p. 238].
These forces are separated by mission areas which include:
antiair warfare (AAW) , antisurface warfare (ASUW) , and
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antisubmarine warfare (ASW) . The integrated naval battle
force normally consists of one or more battlegroups , which
include various combinations of aircraft carriers,
battleships, guided missile cruisers, frigates, destroyers,
and other escort vessels.
2. Tactical Command and Control
The composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine
provides the tactical command and control structure for the
integrated naval battle force in the accomplishment of its
mission.
The CWC doctrine enables the officer in tactical
command (OTC) of the naval force at sea to aggressively
wage combat operations against air, surface, and
subsurface threats while carrying out the primary
mission of the force. [Ref. 14:p. 111-112]
The command relationships are depicted in Figure 15 [Ref.
14:p. 112]. The OTC is often the CWC, depending on the size
of the battle force. Each of the subordinate warfare
commanders is designated by, and accountable to the CWC.
"The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting,
evaluating, and disseminating tactical information, and, at
the discretion of the CWC, are delegated authority to
respond to threats with assigned forces." [Ref. 14 :p. 113]
The AAWC (AAW commander) , ASUWC (ASUW commander) , and ASWC
(ASW commander) are directly responsible for their
respective mission areas. The CWC is flexible in the
amount of authority he may choose to delegate to each of the









delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending
upon the threat and the tactical situation." [Ref. 14 :p.
112]
H. U. S. COAST GUARD
1. Maritime Defense Zone
Since World War II, the U. S. maritime strategy has
emphasized the forward offensive strategy of the Navy with
little or no regard to the coastal defense of the U. S.
littoral regions [Ref. 14]. Alfred Thayer Mahan, called the
"philosopher of sea power" [Ref. 59:p. m-62], recognized
that there was a "fundamental need for (coastal) defense."
[Ref. 58] "Mahan strongly endorsed offensive actions over
defensive actions in the majority of maritime
situations .. .but he was quick to warn that 'offense...
dominates, but does not exclude' the need for defense."
[Ref. 58] Kahan also indicated that the Navy's primary
concern should be offensive, and that defense of the
homeland should be done by others. In 1980, the Navy Coast
Guard (NAVGUARD) board was formed to address the issues of
coastal defense. The board was co-chaired by the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations and the Vice Commandant of the Coast
Guard. The NAVGUARD board commissioned a study to
determine the wartime tasking of the Coast Guard, which is
part of the Department of Transportation, not the Defense
Department. As a result of the commission's
recommendations, the Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZs) were
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established in March 1984. In the event of war, the Navy
would assume command of the MARDEZ commands. "The Maritime
Defense Zone is a Navy mission, similar to the old sea
frontiers concept, which places a Coast Guard admiral
directly under each Navy Fleet Commander in Chief." [Ref.
60 :p. 53] The mission of the MARDEZ is to:
. . .plan for and when directed, conduct, coordinate, and
control operations in the area designated as the MDZ,
as required in order to ensure the integrated defense
of the area, to protect coastal sea lines of
communications, and to establish and maintain necessary
control of the vital coastal sea areas, including
ports, harbors, navigable waters, and offshore assets
of the United States, exercising both statutory and
naval command capability. [Ref. 58]
The mission also includes:
Naval control of shipping;




Coastal surveillance and interdiction;
Convoy escort;
Wartime search and rescue; and
Inshore undersea warfare. [Ref. 58]
2. Wartime Command and Control
There are two Maritime Defense Zone commands:
Commander, U. S. Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic
(COMUSMARDEZLANT) ; and Commander, U. S. Maritime Defense
Zone Pacific (COMUSMARDEZPAC) . Coast Guard vice admirals
are in charge of both commands. These commands are
122
equivalent to the numbered fleet commands of the Navy. The
command relationships are depicted in Figure 16 [Ref 58].
The MARDEZ commanders' area of responsibility extends from
the coastline seaward to 2 00 nautical miles. The MARDEZ
commands are further divided into sectors which are
commanded by Navy or Coast Guard rear admirals. [Ref. 58]
In the event of war, the MARDEZ command and control
structure will be readily integrated into the Navy C^
structure.
I. SUMMARY
Various theories have sprung up concerning organizations
and the dynamics of the groups that exist within the
organizations. A vital aspect of command and control that
is often ignored is the study of the construction of the
organization or, in broader terms, the architecture of the
system in question. This aspect of command and control will
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A basic understanding of architectures and their uses is
fundamental to all aspects and all levels of command and
control and the 0?- system. The development of an
architecture is the first stage of the system engineering
process [Ref. 39:p. 82]. Architectures come in a variety
of forms and have a variety of applications. Many
architectures are actually architectures of architectures.
Simply, an architecture is "the structure of anything," or
"the art or science of building." [Ref. 62 :p. 53]
Architectures, as they apply to combat systems are described
as a "translation of function into form." [Ref. 15:p. 99]
Some general definitions for system architectures are listed
here:
A specific arrangement of basic elements (of a system)
satisfying the required functions and boundary
conditions of the system; [Ref. 39:p. 82]
An integrated set of systems whose physical entities,
structure, and functionality are coherently related;
and [Ref. 61:p. 9]
A generic design which partitions combat systems into
parts, describes their functions and defines the
interrelationships between the parts. [Ref. 63 :p. 62]
Architectures serve a variety of purposes. Generally,
system architectures provide for:
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The clear identification of subsystems;
The allocation of functions to subsystems; and
The establishment of the standards for interfaces
between subsystems.
The identification of subsystems provide the basic framework
for the development and procurement of combat system
components [Ref. 63:p. 62]. The allocation of functions
allows for the generation of system requirements and
specifications. The establishment of standards for
interfacing all the component subsystems is very important.
Not only does it require integration within the system, but
considerations must be made for the integration into other
systems. Some other uses of architectures include:
providing guidance for defining and understanding the
mission of the system, supporting planning [Ref. 64 :p.
68], aiding in the design of systems and subsystems, and
allowing for comparative system evaluation methods to be
developed [Ref. 61:p. 6].
B. C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A C^ system architecture maps the C^ system to the
command and control process [Ref. 15:p. 100]. Another look
at the functions of the commander's C^ process is necessary:
information management, decision management, and execution
management [Ref. 15:p.99]. The C^ system architecture's
role is to provide the framework for the C^ system to
support the C^ process. C^ system architecture is defined
as "the arrangement of (or process of arranging) basic
elements of a...(c2) system into an orderly system
framework." [Ref. 39 :p. 82] It also provides the
"technical framework for subsystem architectures, allowing
for the development of communication architecture,
information system architecture, headquarters architecture,
air defense architecture, intelligence architecture, and so
forth." [Ref. 64:p. 68]
The most difficult part of any command and control
system is the integration and physical interdependency among
the communication and computer systems. The combination of
computer and telecommunication technology has brought about
the opportunity for direct computer information exchange
over great distances. These technological advances have
resulted in requirements for distributed information systems
to interact with other systems of "different design and
manufacture." [Ref. 15 :p. 102] These advances have
significantly enhanced the potential for improved C^ system
effectiveness, while compounding the problems of
interoperability. The 1987 Defense Science Board Task Force
on C^ System Management points out that one of the major
deficiencies in "tactical and theater command and control
systems worldwide" is the "continuing absence of an agreed-
upon, well understood DOD architectural framework with its
well defined interfaces and standards to guide the evolution
of command and control systems..." [Ref. 12 :p. 12]
The International Organization for Standardization has
developed a new architecture called Open System
Interconnection (OSI) to establish "standards for the
design, development, and evolution of distributed
information systems." [Ref. 15: p. 102] These standards
have been extended into the C^ systems arena by the
development of a C^ Reference Model (C^RM) . The goal of the
C^RM model is to:
provide the framework of choice to guide the
development of a consistent set of standards and
specifications for interoperability and to offer
substantial protection of extensive investments in
acquisition by being conducive to the promotion of
modular reuseable technologies. [Ref. 65:p. 1]
The key to understanding, designing, using, and
evaluating C^ systems is the development of a C^ system
architecture that is an integrated structure "that will
support a specific military force under all anticipated
battle situations and conditions." [Ref. 39:p. 82] An
architecture with well defined goals and clearly supportive
of the C^ process is needed.
C. GENERIC ARCHITECTURES
There are three general types of architectures
currently used to describe C^ systems. They divide the
overall architecture into three distinct architectures:
organizational, functional, and physical. The integrated




An organizational architecture is perhaps the most
readily recognized and most commonly used both in the
military and private sector. Basically, it represents the
command structure of the organization. It establishes
clear, unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility.
Figure 17 depicts the organizational (chart) architecture
of the integrated naval battle force [Ref. 66]. The
architecture also shows the relationships between the
various levels of command.
2 . Functional Architecture
The functional architecture performs a functional
decomposition of the various mission areas presented in the
organizational architecture. The generic functional
architecture presented in Figure 18 demonstrates the
various basic functions that need to be performed by each of
the mission areas of the command and control system. These
functions are generic for all levels of command within the
battle force structure. [Ref. 66]
3. Physical Architecture
The physical architecture represents the specific
hardware systems and their physical relationships. It
details distinct communication links between all the
internal and external components that the C^ system must
integrate and interact with. As shown in Figure 19, the
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architecture. The physical architecture will serve as the
primary tool for the system engineers to design and
integrate the physical systems required to perform the
functions presented in the functional architecture. These
two architectures then support the organizational C^
architecture. [Ref. 66]
D. SYSTEMS APPROACH TO ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction
The systems approach concept is the methodology of
the future for the design and development of all weapons
systems. The systems approach is simply an extension of the
system engineering discipline which was developed by Bell
Telephone Laboratories in the late 1930 's. The systems
approach emphasizes "that you cannot concentrate on a single
subsystem, or set of subsystems, .. .but that you must look
at the entire system-- its interconnections, its interfaces,
and its overall effectiveness." [Ref. 19:p. 48] Until
recently, warfare systems were developed and designed in a
piecemeal fashion usually to handle specific requirements of
the warfighting forces. That is, sensors, C^ systems, fire
control systems, and weapons were designed independently of
each other with little consideration for the equipment's
integration into already existing warfare systems. Within
the Navy, this resulted in platform level system
engineering. This platform oriented, bottom-up approach
forced system integration to be dealt with at sea by
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tactical users, not system engineers. The current U. S.
fleet "consists of forces which were not system engineered
or integrated." [Ref. 67]
Major difficulties and debates exist concerning what
exactly is the best overall system, and where to establish
the system boundaries and still maintain a manageable
system. In 1985, the Navy took the initiative and developed
the Warfare System Architecture and Engineering (WSA&E)
concept. The concept embraces the systems approach using
"force-level" system engineering. Although developed by the
Navy, the concept can be tailored for all the services and
at various force levels. The Navy established the system
boundary to be the integrated naval battle force. The
battle force is evaluated as a single integrated fighting
unit and not a hodgepodge of various platforms operating
autonomously in specific mission areas. [Ref. 67]
The steps to the WSA&E concept will be presented
shortly, however, it should be realized that even though
this is a significant step in the right direction, it is not
a complete solution to design problems of future U.S.
military fighting forces. The primary limitation is that
the Navy historically and traditionally has been able to
segregate their operations and missions from the other
services. Unfortunately, most military operations in the
future will require joint operations, as seen recently in
operations in Grenada and Libya. These operations could
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have been conducted by a single service, however, in order
to achieve both military and political objectives, multi-
service forces were required. Although these operations
were short in duration and used limited numbers of forces,
the decision to use a multi-service force indicates the
likelihood of future use of joint forces in larger scale
operations. The requirement for interoperability and
integration of forces from all services is paramount. It is
important for the other services to adopt some form of this
concept and for the Navy to consider the interoperability
requirements with the other services. Although many U. S.
Navy missions are autonomous, the capability to interoperate
with the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard must
exist within the Navy systems. The capability must be
designed into all future systems regardless of cost savings
or service attitudes.
2 . Warfare System Architecture & Engineering
The Warfare System Architecture & Engineering
concept follows five steps leading to force level system
engineering. These five steps include:
Threat determination and analysis;
- National strategy and objectives;
Force level determination and mission definition;
Functional decomposition of the missions; and
System engineering.
Figure 20 depicts the last three steps [Ref. 67]. In the
past, system commands generally acted on the final step and
developed weapons systems to fill requirements of
operational commanders. This method can no longer keep up
with the technology of weapons systems because of the long
development and acquisition process. Weapon systems are
often outdated by the time they reach initial operational
capability. To develop and design modern, fully integrated
and evolutionary warfare systems, the initial three steps of
the WSA&E process are critical.
a. Threat Determination and Analysis
The threat the United States faces, currently
and in the future, must be evaluated and assessed. The
various intelligence organizations of the U. S. perform this
function. The threat assessment must not be limited to the
threat presented by the Soviet Union, but it must also
seriously determine the threat of the third world powers as
well. These threats must be projected into the future, at
least through the life cycle of the forces to be developed.
[Ref. 67]
b. National Strategy and Objectives
JCS Pub 1 provides definitions for national
strategy and objectives.
national strategy— The art and science of developing
and using the political, economic, and psychological
powers of a nation, together with its Armed Forces,
during peace and war, to secure national objectives.
rig^jre 20.
.rchitecrure and Engine
national objectives— Those fundamental aims, goals, or
purposes of a nation, as opposed to the means for
seeking these ends, toward which a policy is directed
and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.
[Ref. 7:p. 240]
A careful understanding of what role the Armed Forces will
play in the national strategy to achieve national objectives
is fundamental. How the Armed Forces will be utilized in
national policy determines the requirements for force design
and capability. Additional requirements on the forces will
be determined by the perceived threat assessment. [Ref. 67]
c. Mission and Force Level Determination
The specific missions of forces must be
determined based on national strategy. These national level
missions are divided among the Armed Forces. Each service
then details the missions of force components that will
fulfill the services requirements. The WSA&E requires that
a system boundary be set for the force being designed to
accomplish specified missions. The debate continues over
where that boundary actually is. Should the boundary be at
the division or corps level, battle group level, battle
force level, theater level, or even the global force level?
Current Navy doctrine lends itself to the integrated battle
force structure as the logical boundary in that the battle
force will operate as a single warfighting unit. Once this
boundary has been established, top level warfare
requirements (TLWRs) are developed. [Ref. 67]
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d. Functional Decomposition of the Missions
During this phase, conceptual frameworks or
architectures begin to be developed and compliance with
TLWRs appears. The mission areas are defined and their
associated functions are further specified. The
relationships among the functions are determined. The
desired performance requirements of each function are
determined with regard to costs, schedules, and risks.
Detailed required operational capabilities (ROCs) are
generated. [Ref. 67]
e. System Engineering
The system engineers convert the ROCs into
hardware. System engineering efforts concentrate on
programs and define the following: force integration
requirements, system performance and test specifications,
and platform interfaces. Available technology is evaluated,
and the adaptability of future technology is planned. The
emphasis is on engineering systems for combat as well as
performance and economy. [Ref. 67]
The WSAScE concept is just one example of using
the systems approach for the development of architectures.
These architectures are readily blended with established
system engineering techniques. The net result is warfare
systems designed from the top down and engineered from the
bottom-up to form integrated and effective warfare systems.
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The goal is to develop a synergistic system for enhanced
weapons system effectiveness. [Ref. 67]
E. CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE C^ PROCESS
1. Introduction
The conceptual architecture of the C^ process
presented here is a result of a study performed in 1986 by
the Armed Forces Staff College as described in "The
Conceptual Architecture and Its Value" prepared by Major
Patrick T. Thornton, USA. The objective of the study was to
"develop a generic conceptual architecture of the command
and control process." [Ref. 13 :p. 2] This architecture
provides the framework for the design of C^ systems which
will support the C^ process. It allows for a more detailed
analysis of the process, as well as an approach to the
"modeling of command and control." [Ref. 13 :p. 2]
The generic architecture includes the processes
which are considered common to each service at all levels of
command. The architecture consists of the general flow of
information and processes which occur through the three
functional areas of the C2 process. As presented earlier,
these three major functional areas are: information
management, decision management, and execution management.
Figure 21 includes all these areas, the "subprocesses or
tasks performed, and the products developed" [Ref. 13 :p. 3],
from within each functional area. The reader is encouraged























Conceptual Architecture of the C^ Process
process it describes. The processes displayed "encompass
the fundamental elements of the military command and control
process." It is these processes which every command,
regardless of level or type of service, performs when
exercising command and control. [Ref. 13: p. 4] Although
the C^ process is cyclical in nature, it must be realized
that the cycle may have "several possible entry points."
[Ref. 13 :p. 4] The overall process is continuous and there
may be several cycles occurring within each of the major
functional areas before the entire cycle repeats itself. It
should also be noted that the commander's staff interacts
with all functional areas [Ref. 13 :p. 6] and demonstrates
the commander's flexibility in influencing the processes
which support him. The environment presents the most
logical point to enter the cycle.
2. The Environment
The environment is the area of responsibility the
commander wishes to influence in some way dependent on his
assigned mission. The environment consists of friendly
forces, enemy forces, weather, terrain, and even rules of
engagement (ROE). [Ref. 13:p. 7] It must also be
understood that the environment on one level of command "is
nested within a larger environment which is of immediate
interest to the next higher commander." [Ref. 13: p. 8]
3. Information Management
The information management area includes all the
activities associated with collecting, processing,
analyzing, and disseminating information about the
environment. Again, this includes friendly forces, enemy
forces, and the physical nature of the environment.
Specifically, these activities include collection,
aggregation, filtration, correlation, analysis, and
dissemination. [Ref. 13:p. 8]
a. Collection and Collection Management
Information collection and management "includes
the total data and information gathering tasks performed" on
the environment. Collection includes all sources, i.e.,
sensors and personnel. It includes organic, inorganic, and
national level assets. Collection management deals with the
allocation of available collection assets based on
priorities determined by the needs of commander. [Ref.
13:p. 9]
b. Information Aggregation
Information aggregation is merely a process "of
amassing the information" collected into some database. The
information is usually raw data, but some of it may have
"some minimal processing and may contain" some evaluation by
the collection agency. [Ref. 13:p. 10]
c. Information Filtration
The process of filtration is critical due to
the large amounts of information available to the commander
on today's battlefield. The filtration process filters the
information in accordance with the specified needs of the
commander. The collected "information receives an initial
evaluation based on such criteria as credibility,
reliability, accuracy, and pertinency." [Ref. 13 :p. 10]
The process also includes a prioritization of information
based on the commander's desire. "...it is essential that
only information pertinent to the current and future
operations of the command be allowed to continue through the
processing stream." [Ref. 13 :p. 11]
d. Information Correlation and Analysis
Information from multiple sources is
correlated, and the process "begins to establish orderly
connections concerning the amassed information...." [Ref.
13 :p. 11] At this stage, a picture of the situation on the
battlefield begins to take shape. A final evaluation of the
correlated information develops into a "body of knowledge."
[Ref. 13 :p. 12] Both the enemy situation and friendly
situation are determined.
e. Information Dissemination
The analyzed information develops a "picture"
of the environment and disseminates it to the commander for
a situation assessment. If necessary, the analyzed
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information is distributed to higher, lower, and adjacent
commands. [Ref. 13 :p. 12]
f. Situation Assessment
"The major purpose of the information
management function is to provide the commander and staff
the most timely and accurate picture of the current
situation that is possible." [Ref. 13 :p. 13] With that
information, the commander performs one of the most critical
functions of the C^ process-situation assessment. The
situation assessment is the commander's "perception of the
current situation." [Ref. 13 :p. 14] Even though this
appears to be the first time the commander has directly
entered the cycle, it must be understood that the
commander, usually through his staff, is actively involved
in the entire C^ cycle.
4 . Decision Management
Decision management involves the development and
analysis of alternative courses of action (COAs) for both
friendly and enemy forces. Friendly COAs are developed
"using such criteria as suitability, feasibility,
acceptability, variety, and completeness." [Ref. 13 :p. 15]
COAs are then analyzed against possible enemy courses of
action. The commander evaluates these alternative COAs and
makes his decision. The commander's decision "is often
influenced by factors which are sometimes called 'non-real-
time' information sources." [Ref. 13: p. 17] These sources
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include the commander's background and experience. [Ref.
13:p. 17]
5. Execution Management
Based on the commander's decision, operational
plans are developed and execution orders are transmitted to
the execution forces. Operational plans consider all
aspects of the operation. Some of those include mission
objectives, concept of operations for forces, logistic
requirements, support, and transportation. "The execution
provides the culmination of the command and control
process." [Ref. 13 :p. 19] The execution of the commander's
orders will influence the environment in some way. The
effects of the execution are then sensed, and the C^
process continues its cycle. [Ref. 13 :p. 19]
It must be realized here that a cycle of the C^ process
can occur in a very short time. Many of the processes
discussed are often skipped, and quick action is often more
effective that the precisely correct action.
This conceptional architecture "presents the command
and control process as a whole, highlighting the complexity
of the process and identifying those major functions and
processes which any potential command and control system
must support " [Ref. 13 :p. 31]
F. SUMMARY
With an understanding of the architecture of generic
command and control sytems, it is now time to examine the
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methods available to evaluate and quantify C^ systems.
Chapter VIII provides the reader with a fundamental approach




The question of how to evaluate command and control
systems has perplexed analysts from all academic
disciplines. The effort to answer the question consumes a
great deal of time and energy from a variety of individuals
and organizations. The C^ systems are extremely complex
and evaluation requires a "multidisciplinary endeavor
entailing technological, economic, organizational, and
cognitive aspects." [Ref. 12 :p. 28] A single unified
discipline to study, specify, or evaluate C^ systems does
not exist. The command and control field is a "world of
organized complexity— complexity being defined by the
number of elements in the system, their attributes, the
interactions among the elements, and the degree of
organization in the system." [Ref. 72 :p. 5] There are two
principal factors contributing to the complexity of C^
systems. First is the human element. "The analysis of C^
system utility requires an understanding of the human
component in such systems." [Ref. 70: p. 167] The force
effectiveness of a C^ system is dependent on the quality of
the decision making processes of the people interfacing
with the system. The contributions of theories from the
cognitive and behavioral sciences must be considered in
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evaluating the overall C^ system. Secondly, the C^ system
cannot be analytically dissected and evaluated, as most
weapons systems can. The interdependencies and
interrelationships among all the various physical
components, as well as the "interactions between the C^
process" and those components add to the complexity of
evaluation. [Ref. ll:p. 880] It is very difficult to
quantify the effectiveness of a C^ system, unlike a
particular weapon system or platform. Even though C^
received more of the attention it deserved in the 1980 's,
the determination of measures to quantify the value of C^
systems has not emerged. An appreciation for the complexity
of the C^ problem has been gained. This inability to find a
standard measure of effectiveness becomes critical in the
battle for limited funding. "If money was plentiful, and if
decision makers did not have to make painful choices across
not only C^ programs, but to combat arms, perhaps no
problems would arise." [Ref. 68:p. 390] It is much less
difficult to demonstrate and quantify the value of a new
weapon system using familiar measures such as thrust-to-
weight ratios, bombs on target, and kill ratios. The key
element in developing improved systems is dollars. The
systems that can prove that they "improve the military's
capabilities to offset the threat" will be funded. [Ref.
70: p. 21] "What is the force effectiveness tradeoff between
an improved communication satellite system and a new
aircraft design?" [Ref. 68 :p. 389] It is not the intent of
this chapter to answer these questions or solve the
problems. This chapter introduces the reader to the nature
of the complexity of C^ systems and their evaluation. A
general methodology for evaluating a generic system will be




It is generally accepted that the systems approach,
mentioned in Chapter VII, is the fundamental approach for C^
system analysis. The analytical method, or scientific
method, cannot solve the problems associated with modern
complex C^ systems. The analytical method is based on the
concept of breaking down the system into smaller components,
independently analyzing them, and then rejoining them in
order to achieve an understanding for the whole system. The
systems approach "does not do away with the analytical
thinking," however, system thinking understands that
"because of the mutual interaction of the parts, the whole
takes on distinctive properties that would be lacking were
one to remove a part." [Ref. 72 :p. 7] The evaluation of C^
systems requires "a mixture of art and science" to achieve
"a balance between the various (system) components, which
rely on many fields." [Ref. 70:p. 21] There are a variety
of system theories that attempt to deal with complex
systems. "Among the more popular are general systems theory
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(GST) , and various specialized theories like cybernetics,
system analysis, system engineering, etc." [Ref. 72 :p. 8]
An ordering of various system approaches is depicted in
Figure 22. Techniques to deal with the behavioral and
organizational characteristics of the command and control
process may need to be developed further [Ref. ll:p. 880].
C. GENERAL SYSTEM EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
There are basically five steps to evaluating a system:
Establish a set of objectives;
Establish system boundaries;
Determine measures of performance/effectiveness;
Perform data collection; and
Analyze data and make conclusions.
1. Est2±»lish a Set of Objectives
The first step in any analysis is problem
definition. Knowing what the problem is, or what the
desired result of the analysis should be, is the main
obstacle. The definition of the problem should contain a
clearly stated set of objectives. The objectives should be
limited to one or two primary concerns, which will later
determine the system boundaries. [Ref. 72:p. 27]
Appropriate assumptions must be identified and acceptable to
the stated objectives [Ref. 71:p. 6-1].
2. Estciblish System Boundaries
The system boundary is defined "as a function of















Ordering of System Approaches
dependent on the objectives stated in the first step. The
boundary is drawn arbitrarily around the parameters or
variables being studied [Ref. 72:p. 26]. These variables
are also determined by the objectives. The boundary clearly
separates the system being evaluated from its external
environment. Anything inside the system is controllable by
the system. "The environment includes all that lies outside
the system's control and that determines, at least in part,
how the system performs." [Ref. 72 :p. 29] All significant
interactions and interfaces must occur inside the boundary.
If this cannot be achieved, the analyst should thoroughly
understand and determine the extent to which external
interactions will impact the ongoing analysis. The
determination of the system boundary is critical to the
success of the evaluation. If the boundary is too narrow,
it is unlikely that a meaningful solution will result, while
making it too broad eliminates the chance of any real
solution. Again, the objectives stated determine the system
boundary. Also, analysts of different disciplines are most
likely going to have different objectives, therefore the
boundaries may be different, as well as the final solutions.
This is acceptable, as long as the desired objectives
provide solutions that are useful, accurate, and
meaningful. [Ref. 72:p. 26]
3. Establish Measures of Performance/Effectiveness
Once a complete understanding of the objectives and
the system boundary is achieved, the analyst can then
determine some quantitative measurement of effectiveness for
the system under evaluation. A measure of effectiveness
(MOE) provides some meaningful reference for comparison and
understanding for something that usually lacks a
mathematical definition [Ref. 68:p. 389]. By using MOEs, "a
highly subjective entity can be treated as though it were
something rather concrete." [Ref. 68 :p. 389] The Military
Operations Research Society (MORS) , a leader in the field of
C^ evaluation, provides the following list of desired
criteria for characteristics of measures.
- Mission oriented— Relate to force/system mission.
Discriminatory— Identify real differences between
alternatives.
Measurable— Able to be computed or estimated.
Quantitative— Able to be assigned numbers or ranked.
Realistic— Relate realistically to the C^ system and
associated uncertainties.
Objective-- Defined or derived, independent of
subjective opinion. (It is recognized that some
measures cannot be objectively defined.)
Appropriate— Relate to acceptable standards and
analysis objectives.
Sensitive— Reflect changes in system variables.
Inclusive— Reflect those standards required by the
analysis objectives.
Independent— Mutually exclusive with respect to other
measures.
simple— Easily understood by the user. [Ref. 71 :p. 6-
13]
Before proceeding, it should be noted that it has been
inferred that the measurement used in the analysis may be
defined as an "assignment of numerals to elements or objects
according to certain rules." Although analysts make
significant use of quantitative methods, "quantification is
only one way of measuring. Another way of measuring, known
as qualitative measurement, does exist and is as meaningful,
and under certain conditions as useful, if not more so, than
quantitative measurement." [Ref. 72:p. 279] Qualitative
methods are more informal and descriptive, and they are
often useful in describing the initial problem, which helps
determine the objectives [Ref. 74 :p. 6].
a. Measure of Performance (MOP)
A measure of performance (MOP) is defined as "a
specific measure of a system's capability to perform
internal activities, without regard to the consequences of
those activities." [Ref. 70:p. 168] Performance relates to
the technical capabilities inside the system boundary [Ref.
70:p. 168-169] Performance describes what a system does,
for example the rate of fire, bit error rate, data storage
capacity, single shot kill probability, etc. [Ref. 73 :p.
25]
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b. Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)
Measure of effectiveness (MOE) is described as
"the quantitative expression of the extent to which specific
mission requirements are attained by the system." [Ref.
73 :p. 20] MOEs are "mission oriented." [Ref. 71:p. 6-12]
MOEs describe what the system performance characteristics
are worth with regard to the system mission objectives, for
example the casualty exchange ratio, probability of mission
success, etc. [Ref. 73 :p. 25.] That is, how effective the
system is in helping to accomplish the system's mission.
Again, it must be emphasized that the "choice of an MOE
depends on the system chosen for evaluation" [Ref. 73 :p.
35] and its relation to the system boundary and the
objectives.
c. Measure of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
Measure of force effectiveness (MOFE) is
sometimes referred to as the "utility measure." It is "a
specific measure of a system's contribution to the total
effectiveness of the associated combat force." [Ref. 70:p.
168] MOFEs examine what effect a complete system, like a C^
system, has on the overall improvement of the combat forces'
ability to accomplish its mission [Ref. 70:p. 168].
Utility or MOFE "relates how (technical) capabilities can
be exploited to improve the effectiveness of a combat
force." [Ref. 70:p. 168-169] It should be realized that a
MOFE for one system can be a MOE for another, and vice
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versa, all dependent on system objectives and boundary. It
is important to understand the distinction between utility
and performance. Performance "relates to technical
capabilities," and utility "exploits those capabilities to
improve force or system effectiveness." [Ref. 70 :p. 168-
169]
The distinction (between performance and utility") is
important precisely because it is utility, and not
performance, which justifies the acquisition of C^
system hardware. A particular communication system or
data-management system might perform very well in a
technical sense. If, however, the technical
capabilities cannot be exploited to support improved Q?-
functions, the system hardware has not been justified.
In the worst case, the system hardware might prove to
be dysfunctional and actually degrade C^ functions.
[Ref. 70:p. 169]
4. Perform Data Collection
In order to effectively analyze a system, the
analyst miust have some means to collect data regarding the
measuremients of perforr.ance and effectiveness that have been
chosen. There are a variety of data collection methods
available.
a. Real World Data
Data collected from the actual use of a system
in its intended environment is real world data. This is an
ideal means to collect accurate data, however, it is
actually the least likely when dealing with military systems
designed for combat situations. Historical data is useful,
but often it is too cumbersome and inaccurate to determine
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specific measures of effectiveness of a system's impact on
the overall force effectiveness.
b. Exercise Data
Data collected from military field exercises
can be very useful provided it is carefully collected and
controlled. Two disadvantages are associated with this
method. Field exercises cannot accurately imitate the true
combat environment the system will operate in, and exercises
can be very expensive and time consuming.
c. Simulations and War Games
Simulations and war games can be very
productive tools for data collection. Simulation attempts
to "imitate the phenomenon" in which the desired analysis is
examining. "The simulation is an abstraction, but it is a
very powerful abstraction when wisely employed." [Ref.
69 :p. 3] War games can be either manual or computer
assisted. With the aid of computers, both simulations and
war games can be run many times in relatively short periods
of time. The primary caution in these techniques is that
the data collected is only as good as the inputs into the
process. The goal is to avoid the result of "garbage in =
garbage out."
d. Experimentation
Experimentation is the classic scientific
method of collecting data. Experimentation is defined as
the process of conducting tests or trials to verify or
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invalidate a hypothesis or some specific objective. It is
usually limited in the amount and type of data which can be
collected. Large field exercises, however, are often
considered experiments.
e. Modeling
The process of modeling is the preferred means
of data collection. "A model is a simplified
representation of the entity it imitates or simulates."
[Ref. 69 :p. 1] There are three basic types of models:
iconic, analogue, and symbolic. Iconic models are "physical
representations of real objects, using a different scale."
[Ref. 72: p. 6] Examples include miniature reproductions of
airplanes, tanks, or even battlefields. Analogue models use
one physical property to represent another physical property
[Ref. 74:p, 6]. An example of an analogue model would be a
map which uses contour lines and colors to represent heights
and vegetation, respectively [Ref. 69 :p. 1] The third type
of model is a "symbolic or mathematical model in which we
employ a set of mathematical symbols and relationships to
represent some real physical situations." [Ref. 74 :p. 6]
This discussion will concentrate on military
modeling as described by the book Militarv Modeling , which
was produced by the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS), and edited by Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.), of
the Naval Postgraduate School. A military model is defined
as "an abstraction of reality, the elements of which are
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chosen for a) an investigative purpose or b) a resource
management purpose, in other words, an abstraction to assist
in decision making." [Ref. 69 :p. 3] The goodness of a
particular model is determined by "how well it achieves its
purpose" or accomplishes the stated objectives of the
evaluation. [Ref. 69 :p. 1] Some common applications of








Command, control, communication, and intelligence
models; and
Cost models. [Ref. 69;pp. 4-5]
All the data collection methods presented, except real world
data collection, are sometimes considered to be some variant
form of a model. With that perspective. Figure 2 3 provides
a useful comparison of the various types of combat models
with regard to four characteristics: operational realism,
the degree of abstraction, convenience and accessibility,
and the impact of human decision on the outcome. [Ref.
69:p. 10]
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A wide range of analytical tools are available
to analyze the collected data. The decision of which
analytical or statistical technique to help draw final
conclusions will be largely determined by the type and means
by which the data was collected. During the problem
definition step, consideration should be given to exactly
how the data will be analyzed in order to ensure
significant results. Improper planning for the statistical
analysis could result in a large amount of data that cannot
be analyzed by a valid statistical procedure.
D. C2 SYSTEM EVALUATION
The evaluation of C^ systems can be approached from
three fundamental perspectives: performance of system
components, or subsystems; effectiveness of the total C^
system; and the contribution of the system to overall force
effectiveness [Ref. 15:p. 119]. Analytical techniques from
many disciplines are required to gain a true understanding
of the C^ system and the relationships between each of the
physical subsystems, as well as the system as a whole [Ref.
ll:p. 880]. "This complex C^ problem involving a diverse
set of environments, policies, force applications,
functions, and resources induces the need for means to
measure C^ assets in terms of their effectiveness in
satisfying the C^ operational requirements." [Ref. 70 :p.
xviii]
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The diagram in Figure 24 depicts the relationships
between the three perspectives and the measures used to
evaluate each level. [Ref. 71:p. 2-5] Within the subsystem
boundary, internal to the system boundary, the dimensional
parameters and measures of performance are evaluated.
Dimensional parameters include those "properties and
characteristics inherent in the physical entities whose
values determine system behavior and the structure under
question ...( size, weight, aperture size, capacity,
luminosity)." [Ref. 71:p. 2-4] MOPs "measure attributes of
system behavior (gain throughput, error rate, signal-to-
noise ratio, display update frequency)." [Ref. 71:p. 2-6]
As you go higher through the levels of command and control
systems, that is, inside out in Figure 24, "the region and
the number of assets that are of concern" is greater, but
the level of detail required is reduced [Ref. 70:p. 119],
The unique complexity of the human interaction in C^ systems
impacts the evaluation process significantly when the system
is viewed from the perspective of a total C^ system. "Any
analysis of C^ system's utility should include an
investigation of the various human decision processes
supported by that system." [Ref. 70: p. 169] The book
entitled Selected Analytical Concepts in Command and Control
presents an excellent discussion on the human element of




D = Dimensional Parameters
P = Measures of Performance (Variables)
E = Measures of Effectiveness (C2 System)
FE = Measures of Force Effectiveness
Figure 24.
c2 System Measure Relationships
. . .most tactical C^ systems exist to support human
decision processes. The decision processes in turn
make up the perception, assessment, planning,
directing, and controlling activities which guide
deployment and employment of combat forces; and
...the degree to which the technical capabilities of a
C^ system (performance) translates into combat-force
effectiveness (utility) largely depends upon the human
decision process which intervenes at each level within
the command hierarchy. [Ref. 70 :p. 169]
Once the total C^ system effectiveness has been
evaluated, the system can now be compared against equivalent
measures of other weapons systems to determine the overall
contributions of each system to the overall force
effectiveness of the battle force in question. Dr. Mort
Metersky of the Naval Air Development Center, located at
Warminster, Pennsylvania, presents an evaluation approach in
his December 1986 paper "A C^ Process and an Approach to
Design and Evaluation." Figure 25 provides a graphic
description of that evaluation approach. [Ref. ll:p. 881]
The difference between weapon systems and C^ systems is that
weapon systems are hardware intensive and Q?- systems are
people intensive [Ref. ll:p. 881]. The C^ system MOP/MOE is
"a union of the Q?- process and C^ physical component's MOPs.
To combine these disparate parts into a C^ system measure
requires development of a model represented by a transfer
function." [Ref. ll:p. 881] As stated earlier, the
measures to evaluate the human component in the C^ process
















C^ System Evaluation Approach
physical components." [Ref. 11 :p. 881] Dr. Metersky
strongly emphasizes the need to concentrate more attention
on the human element in command and control. In the past,
the decision maker was usually assumed to perform in some
set manner within the C^ system, however, with the
increasing advances in expert systems and artificial
intelligence, "the contribution of the human element in
system performance is finally becoming appreciated." [Ref.
ll:p. 889]
The concept of C^ being a "force multiplier" is derived
by comparing the measure of force effectiveness of a C^
system to "an equivalent increase in the number of naval
units involved in the engagement." [Ref. 70: p. 119] In
other words, does the equivalent investment in 0?- systems
provide a better overall improvement of battle force
effectiveness beyond that of a new weapons system or
platform? If so, then Q?- is definitely a force multiplier.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, command and control (C^) , and command and
control systems, concepts, and issues are important at all
levels within the military structure of the United States.
This is true whether one is considering the needs of a small
fighting unit or the requirements of a strategic system
intended to serve all services and, perhaps, selected
allies.
The very nature of command and control itself— with
its broad scope and diverse functions— makes the task of
determining a precise, all-encompassing definition for
command and control very difficult. Also, the correct
identification of command and control systems as such may be
equally difficult. Command and control systems take many
forms. There are systems for data collection, detection and
warning, communications, data processing, and more. Many of
these systems may appear to support functions or
organizations that do not seem to be C^ specific. However,
it is the opinion of the authors of this thesis that any
system which provides a flow of intelligence, data, or
information to the commander, and/or allows for decisions
and direction to be relayed from the commander to the
forces to be controlled, fulfills vital command and control
functions and is, therefore, a command and control system.
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The challenges that await the C^ specialist are many
and varied. Command and control systems require continual
upgrade and modernization to keep pace with new directions
in technology. Also, a firm grasp of system architecture
theory and command and control system evaluation is
required to allow the innovative design of new systems or
the remodeling of old systems. Finally, the C^ specialist
must strive to maximize command and control effectiveness
while faced, as often is the case, with the problem of
gaining adequate advocacy. Further, as the requirements for
joint interoperability become more demanding, the more
demanding will be the challenge of dealing with the problems
caused by service parochialism.
This thesis has sought to present a basic introduction
and overview of command and control and the wide spectrum of
issues with which command and control specialists must be
prepared to contend.
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